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ABSTRACT
This case study of the current U.S.-Japanese bilateral 
relationship attempts to provide empirical insights into the themes 
of interdependence, change, uncertainty and cooperation in 
international relations. It examines the growing interdependencies 
between the two nations as both are becoming more sensitive and 
vulnerable to each others choices. In addition, it analyzes the 
constraining effects of rapid change on a state's ability to adapt 
to a transforming environment. The management of uncertainty 
produced by these dynamics has important implications for future 
forms of cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. Although both 
states are redefining goals and policies, their future relationship 
will remain similar to the present.
vi
THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN
CHAPTER 1
INTERDEPENDENCE AND PROBLEMS OF COOPERATION 
IN A WORLD OF SHIFTING CAPABILITIES
INTRODUCTION
The themes of interdependence, change and cooperation have 
become central to the study of international relations. Since 
WWII, the pace of change has increased, forcing states to become 
mutually dependent in their economic, political, military and 
social relations. This complex interdependence and the ability 
of states to adapt to change affects the possibilities of 
cooperation and of conflict.
This thesis attempts to show the difficulty of identifying 
national goals and formulating policies as state power, perceived 
interests and cultural values are changing. It will not discuss 
the forces for change so much as their effects and the attempts 
that have been made to manage them. Consequently, the difficulty 
of adjusting to new world roles has profound implications for 
cooperation and world order.
As a case study I will focus on the U.S.-Japanese bilateral 
relationship which, because of its combined economic and military 
power, inevitably affects the stability of the international 
system. The relationship provides a good example of both the 
positive and negative effects of interdependence and the problems 
of adjusting policies to mutual expectations in a world of 
shifting capabilities. First, I will briefly discuss the
2
3differing definitions of interdependence and their broader 
implications concerning uncertainty, cooperation and conflict.
INTERDEPENDENCE 1
Definitions
Most definitions of interdependence discuss either its 
constraining effects on a state's ability to make independent 
choices, or, the relative impact of both events resulting from 
these choices and the forces of the international system on state 
behavior.2 For example, Oran Young defines the concept as 
"...the extent to which events occurring in any given part or 
within any given component unit of a world system affect (either 
physically or perceptually) events taking place in each of the 
other parts or component units of the system."3 Young, then, 
takes a systems approach in defining interdependence by focusing 
on the degree of impact of events on actors within the 
international system.
1 Interdependence here refers to dependency relationships 
between "developed" states.
2 For a good summary of the different assumptions held by 
realists and pluralists concerning international relations, see 
International Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism, and Globalism 
, ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (New York: MacMillan 
Publishing Company, 1987), 11.
3 Oran Young, "Interdependencies in World Politics," in 
International Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism, and 
Globalism. ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (New York: 
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 726-50.
4Arthur Stein states that "...an actor's returns are a 
function of other's choices as well as its own...interdependence 
in the international arena...makes mutual expectations, and 
therefore perceptions, very important."4 Contrasting this 
definition with Young's, Stein emphasizes the degree to which 
actors' choices affect one another in addition to the influence 
of the international system itself. The context of 
interdependence forces states to take into account mutual 
expectations as the use of force becomes less relevant.
Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, as theorists who 
attempt to integrate both realist and pluralist perspectives, 
study both the influence of actor's choices and the international 
system on outcomes. For instance, they state that 
interdependence entails "reciprocal effects among countries or 
among actors in different countries".5 They do not attempt to 
prove whether state choices or the structure of the international 
system produce reciprocal effects. Rather, it is assumed that 
both do. This definition focusses on the outcomes themselves and 
their effects on other countries. The drawback, however, in 
focusing on the international level of analysis lies in the
4 Arthur Stein, "Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in 
an Anarchic World," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. 
Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 132.
5 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Realism and Complex 
Interdependence," in International Relations Theory: Realism. 
Pluralism, and Globalism. ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi 
(New York, N.Y.: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 381.
inevitable downplaying of the importance of the domestic policy­
making process on outcomes.
In examining the U.S.-Japanese changing relationship, both 
state policies and the transformation of the international system 
will affect its future character. Currently, the interaction of 
these two variables is causing friction between the two 
countries. Underlying these dynamics and the realization that 
states must reevaluate past policies, is a relative shift in 
power defined more in terms of economic rather than military 
influence.
Reciprocal effects created by policies and the transforming 
system vary according to the degree and type of interdependence. 
Further, international issues arising from these effects are the 
result of states questioning the terms of interdependence.6 For 
example, in terms of the current trade dispute, Japan may ask the 
question; can we drastically reduce trade with the U.S. in order 
to decrease our dependency upon them? They may also ask; can we 
effectively defend ourselves without U.S. military forces? The 
U.S. may ask the same question concerning trade with Japan. In 
addition, does the U.S. need military base rights in Japan or can 
it transfer them to other areas which would be just as effective?
To clarify interdependent relationships, Ernst Haas defines 
them in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability. He states that;
6 Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-linkage and 
international regimes," World Politics (1987): 362.
6Sensitivity is measured by the perceived effects of 
interrupting a pattern of interdependence. Vulnerability is 
measured by the opportunity costs incurred by making 
alternative arrangements for collaboration when the initial 
arrangement breaks down. Unequal sensitivity and 
vulnerability amount to asymmetrical interdependence.7
The U.S.-Japan interdependent relationship includes issue-areas 
such as defense, trade and foreign aid where the degree and type 
of dependence within each varies over time.
Sensitivity can be used in the context of the U.S.-Japan 
economic relationship while vulnerability can be used to analyze 
the military relationship. The sensitivity of Japan shifting its 
trading or investment pattern away from the U.S. is measured 
according to the perceived effects on its own economy as well as 
the U.S.. In terms of vulnerability, some Japanese and U.S. 
policy-makers are weighing the opportunity costs of making 
alternative military arrangements between the two countries.
They are questioning the initial arrangements, outlined in the 
Mutual Security Treaty, because of the perceived inability of the 
U.S. to maintain overseas commitments at current levels.
However, measuring these variables to determine the degree of 
asymmetry in the overall relationship is a difficult task. 
Analysts, for instance, use trade and financial flows and the 
number of troops and aircraft carriers as objective measurements. 
However, the interpretation becomes subjective when determining 
which is more influential, economic or military power.
7 Ibid., 363.
Nevertheless, choices made by both countries plus the 
transformation of the international system will affect their 
future relationship. In both instances, relative power shifts 
will influence the outcomes.
Broader Implications
Just as interdependence encompasses many definitions, it 
fosters broader implications for policy. Realists such as Waltz 
focus on the dominance-dependence relationship where dependence 
implies vulnerability, increasing the chances of conflict. In 
order to avoid this outcome, states should seek to be less 
interdependent and less vulnerable to other state's actions in 
order to survive in the international system.8 Maximizing power 
implies decreasing one's dependency on other states.
Pluralists focus on the asymmetry of state to state and 
group to group relations which may result in cooperation just as 
much as conflict. To provide a balanced understanding of 
international relations, that is, focussing on peaceful change 
rather than war as a mechanism for change, pluralists attempt to 
explain how states cooperate given their interdependent 
relationship.
Elaborating on the theme of mutual effects, Keohane 
emphasizes the asymmetry and sensitivity of state relations.
8 Viotti and Kauppi, 54.
8"...Interdependence by no means implies equality. 
Interdependent relationships are more or less 
asymmetrical depending on the characteristics of issue 
areas and the attitudes and interests of elites, as 
well as on the aggregate levels of power of the states 
involved. Thus we use the term "interdependence" to 
imply some degree of mutual effect"9
As relative dependency shifts, in the case of the U.S. and Japan, 
both countries attempt to adjust policies within issue areas such 
as military, trade and finance, and foreign aid. Although this 
period of uncertainty may cause some discord, the presence of 
conflicting and complementary interests can create the potential 
for cooperation. In the long run, states may find it in their 
best interest to adjust policies to the preferences of others. 
According to these possibilities, then, the concept of 
interdependence bears directly on the problems of uncertainty and 
subsequently the possibilities of cooperation and discord in 
international relations.
THE RELATION BETWEEN INTERDEPENDENCE AND UNCERTAINTY
The broad concept of change also influences types and 
degrees of interdependence and uncertainty.10 It affects the 
vulnerability and sensitivity of one state to another. As
9 Keohane and Nye, "International Interdependence and 
Integration", in Viotti and Kauppi, 361-378.
10 Robert Gilpin identifies processes such as economic 
globalization and internationalization of production that are 
transforming relationships into higher levels of interdependence. 
See "Forces for Change," Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry, 
no. 3 (1989): 27.
preferences are based on state power, perceived interests, and 
cultural values, the effects of change on these variables can 
also cause uncertainty in state relations.
Realists such as Kenneth Waltz, David Singer and Karl 
Deutsch all agree that uncertainty is a function of the number of 
actors involved.11 As the number of actors in the international 
system increases, so does the amount of uncertainty about the 
effects of actions taken by decision-makers. Combining the 
implications of Stein's idea of interdependence with the above 
conclusion, as the number of actors in the international system 
increase, so do the number of choices an actor must confront.
The reciprocal effects of these choices depends on the actor's 
own decisions as well as others.
This conclusion implies that the capacity of states to 
gather accurate information concerning others' preferences 
decreases as many more actors are included in the system. Thus, 
uncertainty results when information is difficult to obtain, 
making expectations unknown. This uncertainty influences the 
possibilities for cooperation.
11 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," 
Daedalus 93 (Summer 1964): 881-909; Karl W. Deutsch and J. David 
Singer, "Multipolar power systems and International Stability," 
World Politics 16, no. 3 (April 1964): 390-406. Cited in Viotti 
and Kauppi, 54.
10
UNCERTAINTY AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION OR DISCORD 12
Many Realists, searching for the causes of war, focus on the 
confusion prevalent before major wars such as WWI and WWII. When 
mutual expectations are unknown, misperceptions about an actor's 
intentions and events may produce inappropriate policies. 
According to realists such as Waltz, as this uncertainty 
increases, the potential of actors to misjudge intentions is more 
likely to cause conflict.13
In contrast, Singer and Deutsch, maintain that uncertainty 
produces cooperation. Uncertainty forces actors to be cautious 
and to "follow tried and true policies of the past".14 Any 
mistake in formulating new policies may be too costly in terms of 
loss of military, economic and political power.15 However,
12 Examining the concept of cooperation, Robert Axelrod and 
Robert Keohane state that, "...world politics is not a 
homogeneous state of war: cooperation varies among issues and 
over time". Furthermore, "cooperation is not equivalent to 
harmony. Harmony requires complete identity of interests, but 
cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a 
mixture of conflicting and complementary interests. In such 
situations, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior 
to the actual or anticipated preferences of others. Cooperation, 
thus defined is not necessarily good from a moral point of view". 
A state's conception of cooperation affects the possibilities of 
achieving it. See "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions," International Organization : 226.
13 Viotti and Kauppi, 54.
14 Ibid.
15 ibid.
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inevitably, change seems to force a redefinition of power, 
interests, policies and goals. Following proven policies of the 
past becomes outdated and inappropriate as the context of the 
relationship changes. Cooperation or conflict depends on whether 
states can adjust policies to changing expectations. The larger 
question, which is beyond the scope of this paper but 
nevertheless related, asks which is the most likely method of 
cooperation on the international level. Will hegemonic 
leadership, international regimes or some compromise of the two 
facilitate stability?
CONCLUSION
This broad development of interdependence, the causes of 
uncertainty and its effects on cooperation and conflict bears 
directly on the U.S.-Japanese relationship. The current disputes 
in trade and defense areas illustrate the sensitivities, 
vulnerabilities and asymmetries in the relationship. Whether 
they will both adapt to changes in mutually beneficial ways is 
uncertain.
The body of this paper will examine the problems of 
redefining world roles, their effects on policy and in turn, 
their influences on the complex interdependent U.S.-Japanese 
relationship. Specifically, chapter 2 discusses the constraints 
on, current attitudes regarding and possible future scenarios of 
Japan's changing world role. Chapter 3 examines the concept of
12
"burden-sharing" and the difficulties of defining state goals and 
identifying mutual interests while forming policy. Chapter 4 
analyzes in detail the problems within the U .S .-Japanese 
relationship in the areas of military, trade and finance, and 
foreign aid. The final chapter will draw conclusions concerning 
external and internal constraints on Japan as it attempts to 
develop a new world role. This process will directly affect its 
relationship with the U.S. and the possibilities of cooperation.
CHAPTER 2 
JAPAN'S CHANGING WORLD ROLE
This chapter discusses Japan's changing world role. It 
attempts to answer the questions: What are the constraints on 
Japan's internationalization? What are the various Japanese and 
U.S. attitudes towards Japan's current role in the international 
system? What are the possible future scenarios of Japan's role?
BACKGROUND
Today the Japanese are faced with the dilemma of assuming a 
leading international role yet there is no domestic or 
international consensus as to what that role should be. Japan is 
the world's largest creditor nation with investments in the U.S. 
reaching $280 billion and 1987 estimates of $21.8 billion in 
Asia.1 It recently surpassed the U.S. as the number one donor of 
foreign aid, dispersing $10 billion annually. Japan's dramatic 
increase in wealth since the 1960s has brought about an increase 
in power at the international level. As its wealth depends 
largely on world trade, Japan recognizes that its national 
interest now includes maintaining a stable world order. Although 
it acknowledge the need to take on a new international 
responsibility for this order, domestic and international forces 
constrain its ability to achieve it.
1 CRS Review, Major Issue Forum. "Japan-U.S. Relations". 
101 Congress, 1st Session, July 1989.
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CONSTRAINTS ON JAPAN'S INTERNATIONALIZATION2
Japan's past reputation and, to a lesser extent, traditional 
values are both obstacles to its integration into the world 
political and economic arena. Aside from its constitution which
prohibits armed aggression, the main factor preventing Japan from
assuming international responsibilities commensurate with its 
economic power is the aggressive and brutal reputation it
acquired during WWII. Many Japanese fear a return to
imperialism, militarism and another devastating war, which were 
the result of Japan's previous efforts to internationalize. At 
the international level, the U.S., Asian states and Western 
Europe remain cautious about Japan's rise in power. Korea and 
China remain resentful towards Japan for its WWII occupation 
while the U.S. uses Japan's aggressions as an excuse to contain 
its expanding power. Thus, past images shape current domestic 
and international perceptions of Japan.3 Although Japan's past 
imperialistic tendencies evoke concern about its current 
intentions, the majority of states recognize the need for Japan 
to share the burden of world stability in an era of shifting 
capabilities. The problem is, these competing perceptions
2 Barry Buzan conceptualizes Japan's internationalization as 
a two-way street, that is, Japan opening up to outside influence 
and foreigners being receptive to Japanese culture and society. 
See his article "Japan's Future: Old History Versus New Roles", 
International Affairs (1988): 573.
3 Ibid., 557.
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prevent the political consensus needed to forge Japan’s new world 
role.
In addition to its aggressive reputation, perceptions of 
traditional values limit Japan's ability to integrate into the 
international system. The Japanese, according to some, maintain 
values such as "perseverance, frugality, effort, family, 
community, sacrifice, humility, the spirit of harmony and 
deference for the elderly" in addition to ambition, motivation, 
and drive.4 To others they are innately aggressive and ruthless. 
The Japanese are ambitious and driven to create a strong Japan 
but not necessarily to be a world leader. These isolationist 
tendencies are a result of its pre-WWII isolationism and the 
disastrous effects of its WWII expansionism.5 But the dilemma 
arises between Japan's growing economic power and pressures 
forcing it to assume more responsibility for world order.
On the one hand, Japanese society does not want to revert to 
imperialism or militarism, thus, a greater international role 
through military means remains subordinate to domestic 
considerations. On the other hand, the Japanese want to play a 
greater economic and cultural role in international society where 
leadership qualities are needed. The problem remains that if 
Japan does become more ambitious and aggressive even in these 
fields, Asian Pacific states and the U.S. may perceive this
4 Takashi Inoguchi, "Four Japanese Scenarios for the 
future," International Affairs (1989): 13-25.
5 Ibid.
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change as a resurgence of Japanese power and expansionism. The 
fear of economic power translating into military power still 
prevails especially in China and the two Koreas.6 One can see 
that perceptions of Japanese intentions are still conceived in an 
historical context which remains an obstacle to developing a new 
leadership role for Japan.
REEVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL ROLE
Japanese economic prosperity, a slowdown in U.S. growth and 
competitiveness, and generational changes are causing Japan to 
reevaluate its traditionally passive role in society. Japan's 
present role exchanges U.S. military protection for support for 
U.S. foreign policy. However, discord in the areas of trade and 
defense, a result of shifting capabilities in the international 
system, threatens to undermine the strong bilateral relationship 
which the U.S. and Japan have maintained since the end of WWII. 
Although many Japanese continue to see the U.S. as its "big 
brother", this view is losing support especially among the 
younger generations who seem more confident about Japan and its 
future. Increased wealth, greater demands imposed upon Japan by 
its trading partners, and its doubts about U.S. capabilities and
6 Paul Kennedy observed that in the past, states whose 
economic base deteriorated also declined militarily. See 
his book, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random 
House, 1987).
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commitments are spurring this reevaluation.7 Thus, external 
forces as well as internal elements are pressuring Japan to make 
difficult choices concerning its future world role.
PRESENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS ROLE
The U.S. first saw Japan as an expansionist, militaristic 
state during WWII. After WWII and the establishment of the 
Mutual Security Treaty, the U.S. became Japan's protectorate by 
dominating its foreign policy and financially supporting its 
reconstruction. In return, devastated by the war, Japan was 
content to play the role of "little brother" and political ally 
to the U.S.. Japan's interests coincided with the U.S.'s, that 
is, both wanted the reconstruction and democratization of Japan 
for trade and security reasons.8
One view, then, portrays Japan as a "little brother", 
obedient and supportive to U.S. security interests while the U.S. 
insures prosperity and protection from foreign aggression. That 
view, however, has been changing since 1960 as the burden of 
responsibility for world order is proving too great for the U.S.
7 "Sharing the Defense Burden with Japan: How much is 
enough?," Japan Economic Institute, no. 19A (13 May 1988): 3.
8 Mike Mansfield, "The U.S. and Japan: Sharing our 
Destinies," Foreicrn Affairs (Spring 1989):
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to shoulder alone.9 U.S. commitments are exceeding capacity in 
military, economic and foreign aid terms reflected in large 
budget deficits. Much of the frustration which coincides with 
this dilemma is directed toward Japan because of its huge trade 
surplus with the U.S.
From this development, a second American view concerning 
what role Japan plays in the international arena sees Japan as a 
"free-rider" on defense and executors of unfair trade practices. 
Patricia Schroeder, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Burden- 
sharing cited U.S. commitments exceeding capacity and Japan's 
inadequate contributions as reasons why Japan should shoulder a 
bigger share of defense responsibility.10
These competing views stem from differing assumptions 
concerning common interests. James Fallows maintains that U.S.- 
Japanese interests clash in a fundamental way. He states that 
the;
...conflict arises from Japan's inability or 
unwillingness to restrain the one-sided and destructive 
expansion of its economic power. It is one-sided 
because Japanese business does to other countries what 
Japan will not permit to be done to itself. It is 
destructive because it will lead to exactly the 
international ostracism that Japan most fears, because 
it will wreck the postwar system of free trade that has 
made Japan and many other nations prosperous, and
9 For a critique of the declinist literature see Samuel P. 
Huntington's "The U.S.-Decline or Renewal?," Foreign Affairs 
(1989).
10 House Committee on Armed Services, The Interim Report of 
The Defense Burdensharing Panel. 100th Cong., 2nd sess., August 
1988, Committe Print, 23, 62-66.
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because it will ultimately make the U.S.-Japanese 
partnership impossible to sustain.11
Mike Mansfield, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan from 1977-89, 
argues that the U.S. and Japan share the same fundamental 
interests and objectives; "...a more secure, democratic and 
prosperous world." 12 Basing his argument on the assumption that 
interdependence produces uncertainty, Mansfield states that he is 
optimistic "because neither the U.S. nor Japan have the option of 
going it alone anymore. 13 Both sides have more to gain by 
cooperating on trade and defense issues than by pursing different 
paths. Though they may not have common interests, pressures may 
force the two to cooperate. That is, in theoretical terms, 
cooperation based on common aversion may prevail.14 Neither side 
wants an unstable system because their success depends on stable 
trade and defense relations. He cites foreign economic 
assistance, contributions to international organizations and 
regional issues as areas where the U.S. and Japan enjoy 
cooperation.15
11 James Fallows, "Containing Japan," The Atlantic (May 
1989): 41.
12 Mansfield, 13.
13 Ibid., 15.
14 See Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: 
Regimes in an Anarchic World," ed. Stephen D. Krasner, 
International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 
125-127.
15 Mansfield, 13.
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These contradictory views of Japan on both sides do not 
provide a consensus as to what Japan's future role ought to be. 
The Japanese view themselves as on the one hand a non- 
confrontational, isolationist nation and on the other a promoter 
of world peace and development. The U.S. sees Japan as a 
combination "little brother", political ally 16 , "free-rider" 
and opportunistic economic power. A reevaluation of history 
which shows that Japan's past was normal when compared to 
Germany's past would be useful in changing Japan's "bad" 
reputation.17
JAPAN'S POSSIBLE FUTURE WORLD ROLES
As stated earlier, both the U.S. and Japan are ambivalent 
towards what role Japan should play in the international system. 
Inoguchi's "visions of the future" encompassing the next 25-50 
years present different views on "the future of global
development, the distribution of economic and military power, and
institutionalization for peace and development".18 
"Pax Americana II", "Joint Hegemony", "Pax Consortium" and "Pax 
Nipponica" all foresee different roles for Japan in economics, 
defense and foreign aid.
16 The Japanese are apprehensive toward using the term
"alliance" because it implies a military role for Japan in its 
relationship with the U.S.
17 Buzan, 566.
18 Inoguchi, 16.
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Pax Americana II
Most Americans imagine the U.S. retaining its leadership 
role in the world and taking advantage of the institutions of 
order and security it created after WWII. 19 The image reflects 
the importance of international regimes and the balancing of the 
Western alliance while the U.S. revives "composure and 
confidence", combining it with "...the somber recognition of the 
inevitability of national decline in the longer term".20 Paul 
Kennedy uses the term "imperial overstretch" to describe the 
U.S.'s current dilemma.21 He maintains that U.S. military and 
security commitments have drained the domestic economy to the 
point of national decline.22
This view is popular in Japan because it allows Japan to 
play its traditional economic role while the U.S. continues to 
shoulder the burden of global security. In this scenario, Japan 
would be number two to the U.S.. Currently, this position is 
more appealing to the Japanese than Japan as number one, but how
19 Inoguchi, 19. See also Sammuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.- 
Decline or Renewal?".
20 Inoguchi, 19.
21 Kennedy, 515.
22 Ibid.
22
long this would last is unsure.23 Japanese such as Koichi Kato, 
a prominent member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), says 
for the next twenty years, Japan would maintain its number two 
position to the U.S. but after a couple of decades, Japan and the 
U.S. would share the lead in an "equal partnership".24 Joseph S. 
Nye agrees that Japan is our main economic rival but states that 
the U.S. is likely to remain number one because it is unlikely 
that Japan will achieve both military and economic dominance.25
Japan would adhere to increased free trade practices, 
finance and increased Official Development Assistance which would 
benefit the U.S., ASEAN, and the European Community. Domestic 
and international factors will continue to restrain Japanese 
assertiveness in the security area, subordinating it to U.S. 
security leadership. Thus, the "division of labor" will remain 
similar to the present.26 The success of this scenario depends 
on the scientific and technological dynamism both in the U.S. and 
Japan.27
23 Hobart Rowen, "The U.S. Should Accept Idea of Sharing 
Power With Japan," Christian Science Monitor (23 Oct. 1988).
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Inoguchi, 20.
27 Ibid., 25.
Joint Hegemony28
23
Political Scientists, economists and businessmen support the
idea of "joint hegemony" because it articulates the "development
and integration" of the Japan-U.S. economy. The importance of
this integration is supported by Robert Gilpin who states:
...As Japan has become the world's foremost creditor nation 
with a high yen, its internal domestic and international 
policies have had to change...Japan is attempting to reduce 
trade friction and increase its own economic stability 
through shifting to greater dependence on domestic economic 
growth. Of equal importance, however, is that the Japanese 
are attempting to use their newly gained financial and 
technological strength to create, through large exports of 
capital and overseas production by Japanese multinational 
firms, what can best be described as a new "co-prosperity 
sphere" in the Pacific Basin, in North America and, if the 
West Europeans will let them, in the European unified 
market...2 9
In this sense, integration is seen as both a process and an 
outcome.30 It can be broken down into two types, that of 
economic integration and policy integration between the U.S. and 
other regions. This integration also creates a dependency 
relationship between Japan and the U.S.. Japan's economic power 
will be dependent upon trade within U.S. and Asian markets and 
its military security will be dependent upon the U.S. security
28 John W. Dower, "Dual-use technology; Japan's new military 
edge," The Nation (3 July 1989).
29 Robert Gilpin, "Forces for Change," The Journal of 
Japanese Trade and Industry No.3 (1989): 29.
30 For a good discussion of the distinctions made between 
the terms "interdependence" and "integration" see Robert 0. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "International Interdependence and 
Integration," eds. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations 
Theory: Realism. Pluralism, and Globalism. 364.
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system in Asia. For the U.S., it will continue to need Japanese 
markets for exports, Japanese finance and their collaboration on 
high technology developments for defense. It is assumed, then,
that both the U.S. and Japan will maintain common long-term
interests which will allow for both economic and policy 
integration.
This image differs from Pax Americana II by emphasizing the
fact that Japanese economic power could be translated into
military power. But, the feasibility of joint hegemony depends 
on whether or not Japan can change its image as an imperialistic, 
expansionist nation to a more non-threatening one.31
"Pax Consortium"
This image portrays an environment where no single actor 
dominates the rest.32 It rests on the idea of the usefulness of 
international regimes and the "pluralistic nature of policy 
adjustment among the major actors".33 It resembles Pax Americana 
II with its emphasis on "cooperation under Anarchy" and "regimes" 
but it does not advocate the necessity of "moral leadership" or 
"administrative guidance" by the U.S.34 Many Japanese support 
this image because it shuns military solutions to security issues
31 Buzan, 570.
32 Inoguchi, 22.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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and decreases U.S. ability to throw its weight around by focusing 
on the utility of international regimes. In this scenario, world 
order is maintained not by a hegemon, but through consensual 
leadership.
Japan's roles in this image include the pursuit of "quiet 
economic diplomacy" and the creation of a "world free of military 
solutions".35 Regionally, Japan would be the leader of the Asian 
NICs, representing their economic and security interests in the 
international system.
"Pax Nipponica"36
The rise in the value of the yen compared to the U.S. 
dollar, Japan's position as the world's largest creditor nation, 
superior competitiveness and foreign dependence on Japanese 
technology and products, and increasing nationalism support a 
future scenario of Japan's economic power dominating the 
international system.37 Japan's international role as "balancer 
among the continental powers" depends on the elimination of 
nuclear weapons or development of an anti-nuclear defense 
system.38 At present, the latter seems more feasible. Already
35 Ibid.
36 Ezra Vogel, "Pax Nipponica?," Foreign Affairs (Spring 
1986): 753.
37 Ibid.
38 Inoguchi, 23.
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Japan is working jointly with the U.S. on the SDI. Because 
Japan's global role portrays it as the leading power, its 
regional role will also depict Japan similarly.39 This scenario 
emphasizes a shift from a military to economic definition of 
power, thus positioning Japan as world leader.
While it is difficult to defend the importance and 
likelihood of each scenario, this analysis does add to an 
understanding of the possible directions which Japan's changing 
role may take. Again, Pax Americana II envisions Japan playing 
its traditional economic role while the U.S. continues to 
shoulder the burden of global security. Joint hegemony 
emphasizes the integration of the U.S.-Japanese economies and 
policies. Japan's leadership role would be primarily economic 
while the U.S. would maintain its political and security 
leadership. Pax consortium focuses on the usefulness of 
international regimes and the possibility that no single actor 
dominates the rest. Finally, Pax Nipponica portrays Japan's 
economic power dominating the world system as opposed to the 
traditional military might of the U.S. and Soviet Union.
Two polls given by the Japanese government and by academics 
attempt to determine what the ordinary Japanese citizen thinks 
Japan's role ought to be. The government poll asked the 
question; "What kind of role do you think Japan should play in
39 Ibid.
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the community of nations?".40 The 1987 poll produced the 
following results;
1) 50.4% answered Japan should contribute to the
healthy development of the world economy.
2) 3 4.0% answered Japan should cooperate in the
economic development of the LDCs.
3) 31.0% answered that Japan should make contributions
in scientific, technological and cultural 
exchange.
4) 24.2% answered that Japan should make contributions
in the area of international political affairs 
such as mediator in regional disputes.
5) 7.8% answered that Japan should consolidate its
defense capability as a member of the Western 
camp.
The results indicate that most Japanese do not want their country 
to play a major political or security role in the world.
The academic poll asked what emphasis should the government 
place on different government policies.41 The results included; 
55.7% support for domestic economic management, 55.7% support for 
law and order, 45.2% support for social welfare, 44.5% feel the 
government should improve the standard of living, 29.7% think the 
government should emphasize economic power, 27.8% feel the 
government should focus on global economic welfare, 18.8% want 
Japan to target national solidarity and 11.3% feel the government 
should pursue national security as a top priority. These results
40 Department of Public Relations, Office of the Prime 
Minister, Gaiko ni kansuru yoron chosa (Opinion poll on 
diplomacy) (Tokyo: Office of the Prime Minister, April 1988). 
Cited in Inoguchi, 16.
41 Joji Watanuki et al., Nihonjin no senkyo kodo (Japanese 
electoral behavior) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1986). 
Cited in Inoguchi.
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highlight top priority for domestic considerations of social and 
economic welfare.
These results indicate a priority given by Japanese citizens 
to domestic, economic and cultural issues compared to security 
contributions to Japan's desired international role. However,
The Japanese public strongly supports increased military 
contributions within the limits set by the U.S.-Japan Mutual 
Security Treaty.42 This concern is based primarily on a common 
distrust of the Soviet Union.43
Although Japan gives the perception that it wants to become 
a major world actor through diplomatic and economic means, other 
pressures force it to confront military issues. The government 
and most foreign countries want Japan to play a greater role in 
security issues.
For example, Ex-Prime Minister Takeshita stated at the 
Toronto Summit of June, 1988 that Japan should promote an image 
of "Japan which contributes to the world" through "international 
cultural exchange", "cooperation for peace" and "official 
development assistance".44 Although this statement corresponds 
with domestic opinion, government actions have also appeased
42 Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic 
Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 51-52.
43 Ibid.
44 Noboru Takeshita, "A New Impetus for Japan-U.S.
Relations- Contributing More to the World" (Address delivered at 
a dinner hosted by the Japan-America Society of Chicago, Chicago, 
IL, 22 June 1988), 5.
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foreign demands. Japan agreed to collaborate with the U.S. on 
development of the FSX fighter planes, gave monetary assistance 
to U.S. surveillance of the Persian Gulf, and increased its 
military budget beyond the 1% of GNP barrier. Thus, one can see 
the Japanese government struggling to satisfy both domestic and 
foreign demands. Japanese leadership seems to react to these 
demands rather than initiating change. Whether or not the new 
government and prime minister are able to effectively lead Japan 
in both defining its new role and fulfilling it remains 
questionable.
CONCLUSION
As the Japanese people and certain government officials 
expressed, Japan wants to emphasize its economic and cultural 
role in internationl society. It recognizes the need to assume 
more responsibility for world stability but through diplomatic 
and economic rather than military and security means. Although 
the rhetoric may sound idealistic, Japan pursues its interests 
according to cost and benefits analysis. They reason that it is 
far more beneficial to pursue economic interests of increased 
trade and business ventures in order to create a strong Japan 
than to spend huge sums of money on military hardware.
How to assume this leadership role without spurring internal 
and external opposition, however, remains a dilemma. Its past 
expansionist, imperialistic reputation remains an obstacle to
30
cooperation both between Japan and the U.S. and between Japan and 
the international community. Members of ASEAN, China and to a 
certain extent, the U.S. fear a resurgence of Japanese military 
might based on its economic power. As Japan struggles to define 
its new role, the current uncertainty limits prospects for 
cooperation.
The problem of defining a new role relates to the 
development and implementation of policy. Because an increasing 
number of internal and external interests are involved, clear 
definitions of goals and thus policies designed to achieve them 
are difficult to establish. The following chapter examines the 
perceptions of and misperceptions about Japanese and U.S. 
interests which complicate their relations.
CHAPTER 3
BURDEN-SHARING:
AN AMERICAN POLITICAL CONCEPT OF INTERDEPENDENCE
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter examined Japan's changing world role. 
Specifically, it analyzed the constraints to its
internationalization, the differing views of the roles it plays, 
and various future scenarios of its world role. The results show 
Japan's intention to assume a responsibility for world stability 
through economic and diplomatic, rather military, means.
However, U.S. demands that Japan spend more on defense, thereby 
sharing this burden with the U.S., conflicts with this view.
The following chapter will discuss the concept of "burden- 
sharing" by focussing on the bilateral relationship between the 
U.S. and Japan. First, I will briefly trace the evolution of 
"burden-sharing" from the late 19 60s to the present. Over time, 
the definition of the concept changed to fit the political and 
security concerns of the U.S. The second section will further 
discuss connotations of "burden-sharing" as a political concept 
and introduce "comprehensive security cooperation" as an 
alternative conceptual approach. The conclusion will show the 
relationships among "cooperation" as a goal and "burden-sharing" 
and "comprehensive security" as approaches to the current 
discord. Because burden-sharing is based on the ambiguous idea 
of "fairness", it affects conceptions of cooperative 
arrangements. Arguments over approaches to cooperation in three
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fields? defense, trade and finance, and foreign aid, jeopardize 
possibilities of mutual adjustment between the U.S. and Japan.
The U.S. coined the term "burden-sharing" as a principle 
embodying a specific U.S. approach to facilitate cooperation in 
an interdependent world. The concept advocates greater security 
contributions by Japan to its alliance with the U.S. These 
demands were established to alleviate the pressures involved with 
being both a military and economic world power. It is also 
intended to serve as a strategy through which the U.S., concerned 
about the slow-down of its economic expansion and Japan, 
overwhelmed with demands from the international community to 
assume a leadership role, could coordinate their policies in 
order to achieve common objectives.
As the U.S. economy expands less rapidly relative to that of 
other states, namely Japan , its capacity to maintain overseas 
military, trade and foreign aid commitments has decreased. Given 
this unstable condition, the U.S., according to Samuel P. 
Huntington, faces the choice of; retrenching its commitments, 
decreasing threats through diplomacy, demanding increased 
contributions by its allies ("burden-sharing"), increasing its 
military power and spending, replacing comparatively costly power 
with cheaper power or developing a strategy to display its
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capabilities.1 In response to these alternatives, the U.S. is 
focussing on "burden-sharing" as a priority.2
DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF CONCEPT
Past
Burden-sharing in the past was based on a more stable 
relationship between the U.S. and Japan.3 The term itself was 
conceived in the early 1960s as a response to the high costs of 
U.S. military commitments in Vietnam.4 Congress wanted to reduce 
U.S. troops and to ask allies to "help us out" in the effort to 
fight the communist insurgency in South Vietnam.5 In this 
context, Japan, because of its relatively weak position both in 
the international system and in its relationship with the U.S., 
did not think of "burden-sharing" in terms of "power-sharing".
1 Samuel Huntington, "Coping With the Lippman Gap," Foreign 
Affairs. vol. 66, no.3 (1988): 456.
2 See House Committee on Armed Services, The Interim Report 
of the Defense Burdensharing Panel.
3 However, as John W. Dower points out in "Dual-use 
Technology; Japan's New Military Edge," p. 18, U.S. policy toward 
Japan was set in an "explicit context of institutionalized 
mistrust". He refers to the 1947 Peace Constitution imposed upon 
Japan, The Mutual Security Treaty of 1951-52, and joint 
operational studies concerning Japan's defense capabilities as 
evidence of U.S. mistrust towards Japan.
4 "Sharing the Defense Burden With Japan: How Much is 
Enough?," Japan Economic Institute, no. 19A (13 MAy 1988): 2-3.
5 Ibid.
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Because of their increasing economic strength compared to the 
U.S.'s, however, the Japanese are changing the meaning of burden- 
sharing to include influence in decision-making with the U.S..
By 1978-79 a series of international conflicts, namely the 
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 
required U.S. responses. They raised the need for costly 
security outlays and caused the U.S. to demand that allies 
contribute to the "burdens of mutual defense" commensurate with 
their economic capabilities.6
In the 1980s, huge budget and trade deficits, $1 trillion 
and $53.8 billion (with Japan) respectively, are causing the U.S. 
to reevaluate its overseas commitments. The U.S. believes it can 
no longer carry the costs of its national security interests 
alone. Therefore, the U.S., especially Congress, believes that 
Japan should spend more money on its own defense.
Japan, on the other hand, faces many obstacles constraining 
its ability to answer demands for a military buildup. Its 
constitution renounces war and the Mutual Security Treaty 
concluded after WWII limits Japan's army to defensive 
capabilities. The government's 197 6 decision to limit defense 
spending to 1% of GDP, domestic criticism based on memories of 
WWII and external fears of a remilitarized Japan have made it 
difficult for Japan to answer U.S. demands.
6 Ibid.
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Present
Burden-sharing is now linked to trade disputes which include 
elements of distrust not previously encountered in the Japanese- 
U.S. relationship. Today’s fears and suspicions do not just 
represent a new level of misunderstanding. Rather, they are 
"rooted in very real and rapid transformations in the basic 
structures of power and influence".7
Whether or not and how to share the costs of U.S. overseas 
commitments are recurrent issues between the U.S. and Japan.
They are also highly emotional issue because the U.S.'s position 
has not improved despite negotiations and economic policies 
designed to reduce the trade deficit.8 Japan continues to 
maintain huge trade surpluses which makes it an easy target for 
U.S. criticism concerning the fair and equitable sharing of world 
responsibilities.
Both in the past and present people have interpreted burden- 
sharing differently. Traditionally, alliance management and 
burden-sharing denoted similar meanings. They both were 
conceived strictly in military terms based on common security 
interests. In this context, trade and economic issues were 
separated from military considerations.
7 Dower, 18.
8 However, the volume of U.S. exports, as opposed to the 
value, has actually increased, leading some Japanese to accuse 
the U.S. of exaggerating the situation.
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Today, however, the concept of "burden-sharing" takes on a 
number of meanings most often stated by government officials of 
both the U.S. and Japan. Within the U.S., Richard L. Armitage, 
former assistant secretary of defense for international security 
affairs, defined burden-sharing as "...a more equitable sharing 
of the roles, risks, and responsibilities of the defense of the 
free world...burden-sharing for democracy".9 Referring to 
"defense", he emphasizes the original military aspect of the 
phrase which focuses on common security interests. But "burden- 
sharing for democracy" places the U.S.-Japan relationship in the 
context of the post-WWII thinking where the containment of 
communism and the spread of Democracy were the primary goals 
which reflected world order. Today, many argue that the U.S. 
should abandon its Cold War policies and focus on economic 
development as a means to achieve world order.
Former Treasury Secretary James Baker III has expressed the 
opinion that Japan and Western Europe should share the burden of 
U.S. costs abroad not just in political and national security 
terms, but also in economic areas by pursuing free trade 
practices. His comment indicated the first time that "burden- 
sharing" had been discussed by the Administration in an economic 
sense.10 Finally, Representative James H. Scheuer , Senator Paul 
Sarbanes and James Baker all agreed that Japan could transfer
9 Richard L. Armitage, "Enhancing U.S. Security In the 
Pacific," Christian Science Monitor. 30 August 1988.
10 Peter Kilborn, "Baker is Weighing a Shift in Military 
Costs to Japan," New York Times. 10 March 1988.
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some of its savings from military spending to increased foreign
i
aid to developing countries.11 Their approach would give burden- 
sharing an enhanced meaning compared to its traditional military 
emphasis.
In contrast, the Japanese emphasize economic and foreign aid 
aspects of cooperation. They use the term "comprehensive 
security" rather than "burden-sharing" as a foreign policy 
approach. The former includes diplomatic leadership, foreign 
economic assistance targeted to strategic areas and strengthening 
of its military within the limits of the security treaty. This 
emphasis coincides with the type of role the Japanese hope to 
play in the future. Already, because of the rise in value of the 
yen, Japan surpassed the United States as the world's number one 
donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) with $10 billion 
in 1988. Ex-Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita stated that Japan 
would act according to its "concept of international cooperation" 
used to define Japan's emerging world role. This concept is 
based upon programs of international cultural exchange, 
cooperation in the cause of peace and increased development 
assistance.12 Former Prime Minister Sosuke Uno and Foreign 
Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka stated that they would continue 
Takeshita's foreign policy which calls for Japan to make a 
greater contribution to "global peace and stability" by expanding
11 Ibid.
12 The Liberal Star. 10 February 1989, 2.
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its economic assistance to developing nations.13 Currently, 
opposition parties within the Japanese Diet, the Japanese 
Parliament, claim that they would use foreign aid as their main 
diplomatic tool if their party were elected into office.14 This 
rhetoric coincides with Japan's efforts to increase ODA as a 
response to external pressures.
As stated earlier, the Japanese are reluctant to assume a 
military leadership role and are more willing to display world 
leadership in economic areas. However, the government is not 
denying that it wants to be a major military actor, as opposed to 
military power, in its relationship with the U.S.. Leadership 
also includes active participation in decision-making. Thus, In 
addition to sharing the burden, the Japanese government also 
reiterates "power-sharing", something the U.S. supports in theory 
but not in practice. Mr. Kuroda, former Vice Minister of MITI, 
gives a common Japanese view of burden-sharing as being "the 
other side of the coin of 'power-sharing'".15 This term refers 
to the sharing of decision-making powers in defense, trade and 
foreign aid matters with the U.S. and within international 
organizations where the U.S., as founder of most international
13 "Foreign Minister Discusses Bilateral Ties" The Japan 
Times, 4 June 1989, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
9 June 1989, 1.
14 "LDP, Opposition Disagree on Use of Aid," The Japan 
Economic Journal. 2 0 May 1989, trans. Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, 25 May 1989.
15 Susan Chira, " Japan Ready to Share Burden, But Also the 
Power, With U.S.," New York Times. 7 March 1989.
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organizations, dominates the decision-making processes.
Analyzing the different interpretations of the concept of burden- 
sharing over time, therefore, reveals the importance of context, 
i.e. values and perceptions, in shaping the meaning of the term.
CONCLUSION
Burden-sharing seeks the "fair" and "equitable" 
distribution of the responsibilities of maintaining a stable 
bilateral relationship. However, the term "fair" is not easily 
defined or measured. To define what is universally "fair" is 
difficult because of varying cultures and values which assist in 
determining individual state rules and objectives. Different 
views of "fairness", as shown in the U .S .-Japanese case, promote 
conflict.
In order to clarify the U.S. position, it is easier to 
examine what the U.S. sees as unfair. In the defense area, even 
though it has been the norm, the U.S. Congress basically does not 
think it is fair that Japan spends only 1% of its GNP on defense 
while the U.S. spends 7%. In trade, dumping, subsidies, tied 
exports, restrictions on market access, cartels, "copying" 
(technology transfer), and "stealing" (patents) are just a few 
examples of current accusations of "unfair" Japanese trading 
practices.16 In foreign aid, tying aid to the purchase of
16 Ellen J. Frost, For Richer. For Poorer: The New U.S.- 
Japan Relationship (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
(1987), 18.
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imports from Japan without opening its own markets is unfair 
because this practice works against the norm of "reciprocity" in 
trade. Other examples of what Americans consider to be "unfair" 
competition include size, where a bigger competitor is considered 
to have an "unfair" advantage over a smaller one, secrecy as 
compared to "transparency", government intervention, and lack of 
initiative towards assuming world responsibilities or "free­
riding" .17
Ellen Frost raises the question: "To what extent does 
fairness consist of universally applicable norms and values, and 
to what extent is it the product of a unique culture and 
history?"18 One can argue that it is only "fair" that Japan, as 
a member of GATT, should adhere to its principles, norms and 
rules. GATT is based on the belief that free trade will promote 
the economic development of all members. The substantive norms 
include liberalization, reciprocity, nondiscrimination and 
economic development.19
Japan and the U.S. maintain unique cultural values which 
influence how they conduct business and form policy. These
17 Ibid., 18-19. Transparency here is used to describe U.S. 
openness in terms of exposing how the government formulates 
policy and how businesses interact. It is claimed that Japan 
develops policy and conducts business too secretively, preventing 
foreign access to information which could benefit them.
18 Ibid.
19 Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and 
Regulation of Trade Barriers," in International Regimes, ed. 
Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 288.
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cultural norms should not be criticized. What should be 
criticized is the clear breaking of norms and rules of 
international regimes to which Japan and the U.S. belong such as 
the GATT. However, the distinction between cultural and 
universal norms is not easily made, which distorts any 
measurement of "fairness". For example, the U.S. is negotiating 
the reduction of Japanese structural impediments to trade which 
include, among other things, its domestic distribution system. 
Japan, however, argues that its distribution system is a unique 
cultural characteristic and should not be criticized.
Assuming what is considered "fair" is to abide by GATT norms 
and rules in trade, World Bank norms for disbursement of ODA and 
bilateral arrangements in defense, many in the U.S. claim that 
Japan is following unfair practices. Congress and businessmen 
claim that Japan is violating GATT liberalization and reciprocity 
norms, WB norms of economic development and defense norms of 
contributing to the alliance "according to ability".
The current discord stems from the perception that Japan is 
following policies which violate these norms while the U.S. is 
unable or unwilling to adapt its policies to changing norms due 
to shifting capabilities. As Keohane notes, the only way actors 
can achieve cooperation is if their "policies become 
significantly more compatible with one another".20 The U.S.'s
20 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984): 53.
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answer to the problem of achieving cooperation with Japan in a 
world of shifting capabilities is through "burden-sharing".
This policy, however, is inappropriate because it seeks a 
cooperative arrangement based on quantitative measures of 
equality. Congress is, in effect, seeking to maintain the 
current form of cooperation by insuring its dominant position in 
issue areas, while at the same time demanding that Japan spend 
more on defense and foreign aid. This approach may not be the 
best solution. Cooperative arrangements are not always "good" or 
"equal", rather, they are based on relative power shifts and 
mutual interests in addition to other factors. In this case, 
context matters. As U.S. influence declines relative to Japan, 
and as Japan's influence increases, policies must adjust to the 
changing situation to avoid friction. Therefore, the best 
alternative in terms of sharing the burden within issue-areas is 
one which takes into account the shifts in power and the 
accompanying influence. Politically, however, conflicting self- 
interests are preventing this approach. The U.S. is not willing 
to admit its loss of influence while Japan does not know how to 
react to its newfound wealth.
In contrast to burdensharing, some experts prefer to use the 
term "comprehensive security cooperation" because it connotates 
mutual rather than unilateral adjustment.21 Rather than offering 
normative prescriptions, the defense burden-sharing panel of the 
Committee on Armed Services should have formed recommendations as
21 Dalton A. West, interview with author, 21 June 1989.
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requests or proposals. In addition, the language is less 
offensive to the Japanese and the concept represents an approach 
which reassesses the U.S. security relationship with Japan. This 
reassessment, analysts argue, should be based on a more dynamic 
approach using roles and missions and should be based on 
additional foundations for security cooperation, not just threat 
perceptions.22
The next chapter will present a more detailed analysis of 
burden-sharing as it is currently used, that is, the expansion of 
the strategy to include military, trade and finance, and foreign 
aid areas. Although an analysis of the present views may repeat 
those stated in the definition, a deeper discussion will clarify 
the current burden-sharing debate and hopefully shed some light 
concerning future possibilities of and limits to U.S.-Japanese 
cooperation.
22 West, "Burden-sharing in the Asia-Pacific: a Partial 
Review of the Interim Report of the House Armed Services Panel on 
Burdensharing" (U.S. Global Strategy Council, Washington, D.C., 
1989), 5.
CHAPTER 4
ISSUE AREAS, ISSUES AND LINKAGE:
POSSIBILITIES OF AND LIMITS TO U .S .-JAPANESE ADJUSTMENT
The last chapter identified burden-sharing as the major U.S. 
approach to maintaining order in a world of shifting 
capabilities. The Japanese approach to stability is based on the 
concept of "comprehensive security". The fundamental difference 
between the two approaches is the degree of emphasis placed on 
military, economic and foreign aid areas. The U.S. Congress 
continues to emphasize military aspects of cooperation while 
Japan focuses on diplomatic and foreign aid areas. At the root 
of the dispute is shifting economic power and current friction in 
trade relations. The following chapter details the U.S. - 
Japanese relationship in military, trade and finance, and foreign 
aid areas and attempts to show the complex interdependence of the 
issues.
MILITARY
Introduction
In the early postwar period, the U.S. and Japan produced a 
constitution for Japan and a security treaty. These two 
arrangements effectively transferred responsibility for the 
defense of Japan to the U.S. This act in turn allowed Japan to
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concentrate on its own economic development.1 Even though 
factions in Japan allowed its defense industry and Self-Defense 
Force to grow, the growth rate was slow so that in the 1980s, 
Japan remains dependent upon the U.S. for its national security.2 
The U.S. accepted this reciprocal arrangement where it would 
defend Japan and maintain safe sealines of communication in 
exchange for base rights and Japan's support of U.S. foreign 
policy.2
Today, the context of this reciprocal arrangement is 
changing as U.S. trade and budget deficits are causing Congress 
to question the fairness and equity of these arrangements. 
Congress states that the
...bottom line to the burden-sharing debate...is how to 
guarantee the economic and military security of the United 
States and its allies in the 21st century and ensure that 
developed countries with mutual defense interests share the 
cost of that defense on a more equitable basis and 
contribute more equitably to the security, economic and 
political well-being of less developed countries 4 ...
1 This strategy is known as the Yoshida Doctrine. Yoshida, 
Prime Minister after V7WII, followed the strategy of economic 
development so that eventually Japan would not have to depend on 
the U.S. for aid and defense.
2 Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic 
Superpower (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 103.
3 Ibid. Also, for a good discussion of the "reciprocity" 
principle as both a policy and system of patterned behavior which 
promotes cooperation, see Robert 0. Keohane1s article 
"Reciprocity in International Relation," International 
Organization 40, 1 (Winter 1986).
4 House Committee on Armed Services, The Interim Report of 
the Defense Burdensharing Panel. 4.
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With this goal in mind, questions arise concerning the U.S.- 
Japanese future relationship. The three main questions 
concerning defense are:
1) Should Japan pay for its own defense?
2) Should Japan share, with the U.S., the cost of defending
itself against foreign aggression?
3) How much military expenditure is enough?
In this section I will outline the main arguments concerning 
these questions including the limits to and possibilities of 
cooperation. First, should Japan pay for its own defense?
Before answering this question, it is necessary to give some 
statistics concerning Japan's defense expenditures, specifically, 
those allocated for 1989 compared to the amount spent in 1988.
Statistics
Currently Japan spends 1.004% of its GNP on defense. This 
amounts to 3.9 trillion yen or $30 billion, one-tenth of total 
U.S. defense spending which equals $3 00 billion.5 However, it 
does mark a 5.9% increase from 1988 expenditures. Of the $30 
billion, about $16 billion will be spent on "on-the-front"
5 Fallows, "Let Them Defend Themselves," The Atlantic (April 
1989): 18.
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defenses and logistics for Japan's 250,000 man Self-Defense Force 
(SDF), a total increase of 16% over 1988. In addition, about 
$1.03 billion, an 18.3% increase over 1988, is set aside for 
defense burden-sharing with the U.S.. Specifically, this amount 
is targeted towards support for U.S. armed forces in Japan and 
maintenance of facilities.
The 1986-90 Mid-Term Defense Plan, the third of such five- 
year plans which began in 1976, attempts to meet the goals set in 
197 6 by Takeo Miki's National Defense Program Outline. The plan 
maintains a budget of $147.2 billion over 5 years. It focusses 
on improving and expanding Japan's air defenses, anti-submarine 
warfare, ground force response to manned invasion, and command, 
communications, intelligence and reconnaissance.6 Japan plans to 
deploy domestically designed and manufactured surface-to-air 
missiles which could intercept invasion forces far before they 
reach the islands. In addition, funding for the next generation 
fighter support aircraft (the FSX) and an over-the horizon radar 
site for defense against long-range Soviet Backfire bombers mark 
major changes in Japan's defense policy.7 The new radar site 
signals the first time Japan has not purchased a weapon strictly 
for its own defense. The radar will be part of a chain of
6 "Sharing the Defense Burden With Japan: How much is 
enough?", 6. It specifically calls for Japan to purchase 50 P-3 0 
anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft, 63 F-15 fighters, 7 C-13 0 
transport aircraft, 6 Patriot surface-to-air missile systems to 
replace outdated Nike missiles, 9 destroyers and 5 submarines.
7 Ibid., 8.
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stations beginning in Alaska stretching to the Philippines.8 The 
FSX is the first major co-production defense project between 
Japan and the U.S.. Thus, much has been done already to meet 
"roles and missions" approaches to Japan's defense spending.
These actions will help Japan meet its mission to defend its 
sealanes out to 1,000 nautical miles and improve its air 
defenses.
Other categories where Japan has made progress in sharing 
the responsibility for its defense include: host nation support; 
joint planning and maneuvers, defense co-production and 
technology transfers, and official development assistance (ODA).9 
Under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treat, Japan provides base 
facilities for U.S. forces. They are used for both Japanese 
security and forward deployment of U.S. forces into the Asian 
Pacific.10 Japan's 1988 defense budget set aside $46,500 for 
each of the 55,000 U.S. personnel, which is 40% of the $6 billion 
cost of maintaining the forces.11
Despite these statistics which show increased spending by 
Japan on its defense, most members of Congress say it is not
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 8-11.
10 Ibid., 8.
11 According to the Interim Report of the Defense 
Burdensharina Panel. 63, this figure of $46,500 per U.S. 
serviceman is overestimated because it includes such intangibles 
as the value of real estate. With this amount subtracted, the 
total spent per serviceman becomes $32,000 which is still higher 
than any NATO country's support of U.S. servicemen.
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enough.12 They cite the fact that Japan spends only 1% of its 
GNP on defense compared to the U.S.'s 7% GNP as the major 
inequality.13
Arguments
a . Linkage
Although groups within the U.S. such as Congress, the 
Administration and businesses all support the goal of a stable, 
cooperative, bilateral relationship with Japan, they do not agree 
on the causes of instability. The Congressional approach links 
the trade deficit to military spending. Specifically, high U.S. 
military expenditures on global security has created the huge 
trade deficit. Japan, it says, uses the money it saves from its 
"free ride" under U.S. security arrangements to become more 
competitive in commercial relations which is detrimental to U.S. 
industry. Japan should spend more of its savings on defense.
12 The Burden-sharing panel uses a measurement known as a 
state's "ability to contribute". This includes its population 
and GDP shares of the U.S.-Japan-NATO alliance. Japan, according 
to this measurement, is not contributing its "fair" share. Out 
of the total percentage of contributions by the U.S., Japan and 
NATO members, Japan contributes 2% of total defense personnel, 3% 
of ground forces, 3% of tactical combat aircraft, 3% of naval 
ship tonnage, no strategic nuclear warheads and s% of airlift 
aircraft. Ibid., 32.
13 However, one comes to different conclusions when 
comparing the amount of Japan's expenditures using NATO's system 
of accounting. Using this system, Japan actually spends, 1.7% of 
GNP which is much closer to the amount spent by NATO members.
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This would take resources away from economic competitiveness and 
reduce the Japan-U.S. trade gap. This argument appeals to 
domestic interest groups including those that have lost because 
of Japanese competition.14
This type of linkage, between issue areas rather than issues 
themselves, can be characterized as tactical.15 In order to gain 
leverage in the trade dispute, Congress is including defense 
spending imbalances as an issue in its argument. They threaten 
that the U.S. may withdraw troops from Japan and let them pay for 
their own troops if Japan does not assume more responsibility. 
Japan maintains that it is not the lack of military spending on 
its part and U.S. overspending which is causing the U.S. to loose 
its predominance. The U.S. budget deficit is ultimately causing 
the U.S. trade deficit. Knowledge concerning the causes of 
instability plus differing goals may prevent a cooperative 
arrangement. The Japanese government criticizes the U.S.
Congress for interpreting the common goal of world order to mean 
maintaining the status quo, or U.S. hegemony. Japan, on the 
other hand is criticized for its ambivalence toward assuming more 
responsibility.
b. Roles and Missions
14 "Sharing the Defense Burden with Japan: How much is 
enough?, " 5.
15 See Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and 
International Regimes," World Politics (1987): 372.
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The administration approach, although recognizing the 
importance of economic shifts and their effects on military 
security, does not link security with trade or other economic 
issues. Rather, it takes a "roles and missions" approach to the 
problem which is motivated by strategic concerns. This "roles 
and missions" approach is synonymous with the concept of 
"comprehensive security cooperation" rather than "burden- 
sharing". In other words, cooperation is based on identifying 
common interests of military and economic security rather than 
unilaterally forcing demands based on quantitative measurements 
of fairness and equality.
In a 1981 joint communique between Reagan and then Prime 
Minister Suzuki, both emphasized that certain expenditures should 
fulfill "mutually acceptable defence goals".16 Thus, defense 
spending should be linked to national security needs, not to 
budget deficits. This represents a substantive linkage approach 
where most experts believe that military expenditures should be 
disbursed according to security interests.17 This type of 
linkage could be more conducive to a successful arrangement 
because Japan and the U.S. maintain similar national security 
interests which are based on a common Soviet threat in Asia.
The roles and missions approach states specifically, that 
the U.S. should continue to provide a nuclear deterrent and
16 "Sharing the Defense Burden with Japan: How much is 
enough?," 4.
17 For an explanation of substantive linkage, see Haas, "Why 
Collaborate? Issue linkage and International Regimes".
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offensive strike force in the Northwest Pacific. Japan should 
strengthen its security of territory, coastal waters, airspace 
and sealanes 1,000 miles south and east. Finally, the U.S. 
should maintain security commitments to Korea and protect the 
sealanes beyond the Northwest Pacific, or, oil routes.18
This argument criticizes Congress' approach to the problem. 
First, the argument implies that Congress does not take into 
account effects of Soviet activities on U.S.-Japanese security 
needs. Second, there is no proof that increased defense spending 
would "hurt" Japan's economy and help the U.S.. Joint research 
and development of dual-use technology could actually help both 
economies. In addition, Fiscal and monetary policy plus 
microeconomic factors also contribute to the state of the 
economy. Third, defense spending is not zero-sum, that is, Japan 
cannot substitute for U.S. military expenditures, it can only 
complement them.19 Costs on both sides are rising and "...the 
point is, U.S. resources will also be needed for U.S. tasks.
Both countries will have to continue to do more to meet their 
responsibilities".20 Finally, the Congressional approach does 
not stipulate exactly how an increase in Japanese expenditures 
should be spent. Thus, internal disputes regarding U.S.-Japan
18 Larry A. Niksch, "Japan-U.S. Relations in the 1990s," 
Congressional Research Service. 89-264F (7 April 1989): 19.
19 "Sharing the Defense Burden with Japan: How much is 
enough?," 5.
20 Ibid.
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defense policies limit the U.S. in its ability to clearly 
articulate its demands.
Japan is limited by both domestic and external opinion and 
article IX of its constitution which states that Japan will 
forever renounce war and the "threat or use of force as a means 
of settling international disputes".21 In light of these 
constraints, Japan has followed the approach of responding to 
U.S. demands one by one rather than taking the initiative in 
formulating its own defense policies. The fact that Japan has 
responded to U.S. demands, although in increments, can be seen as 
a form of cooperation. Because trade frictions are so high, 
however, Japanese progress on defense is frequently overlooked by 
Congress.
In answering the second question, then, Japan is sharing the 
burden with the U.S. of defending itself but many argue it is not 
enough. How much is enough, then? This is a difficult question 
to answer considering the various proposals which have been 
submitted.
Both the House and the Senate continue to focus on GNP as a 
measure of Japan's contribution to cost-sharing. They drafted a 
resolution calling on Japan to spend 3% of its GNP on defense and 
to pay a "defense protection fee" or tariff on all goods shipped 
to the U.S. which equals the difference between U.S. defense 
expenditures and Japanese defense expenditures.22 Congress makes
21 See Japanese constitution.
22 Fallows, "Let them defend themselves," 17.
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a direct link between the lack of burden-sharing in military 
terms and the U.S. trade deficit.
The Department of Defense and the Administration denies this 
link and, as stated earlier, emphasizes linkage of defense 
expenditures according to national security interests. These 
interests involve a common perception between the U.S. and Japan 
of a strong Soviet threat.23 Thus, the question of how much is 
enough must be weighed according to this perception plus external 
and internal limitations to adjustment.
Possibilities of and Limits to Cooperation
Japan's defense budget has increased from $9.82 billion in 
1980 to $30.87 in 1989 at an annual average growth rate of 6%.
Its ability to rapidly increase expenditures, espoused by the 
U.S. Congress' 3% target, is severely limited by national 
security needs, the Mutual Security Treaty and public 
perceptions. However, possibilities for cooperation in the 
security area exist in the form of increased ODA to strategically 
targeted areas, defense technology transfers, joint development 
projects, increased host nation support, and dual technology.24
23 West, Burdensharing in the Asia-Pacific: A Partial Review 
of the Interim Report of the House Armed Services Panel on 
Burdensharing. 7.
24 Dower in "Dual-use Technology", discusses spin-off and 
spin-on effects of dual technology. Technology developed for 
commercial use by Japan can produce "spin-on" effects which 
contribute to the joint development of defense technology.
Defense technology can also have "spin-off" effects, contributing
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Despite current criticism that Japan is not spending enough on 
its own defense, a closer look at the facts indicates that Japan 
has markedly increased its defense spending and plans to continue 
the increase at a 5-6% annual rate.25
It is apparent that until the trade deficit is balanced or 
improved dramatically, Congress will continue to focus on the 
military "burden-sharing" debate as a way to achieve cooperation 
in the trade dispute.
to higher technology for commercial use. These effects are 
thought to benefit both the U.S. and Japan economically and 
militarily.
25 See Nikshe1 Japan-U.S. Relations in the 1990s.
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TRADE AND FINANCE
The U.S.-Japanese interdependent relationship in trade and 
finance is also undergoing a transformation. The past 
asymmetries, where Japan was dependent upon the U.S. for both an 
open market and continuous supply of dollars, are shifting.
Today, the U.S. depends on Japan to finance its budget deficit 
and on a market for its goods.
Statistics
In 1988, trade between Japan and the U.S. equalled $13 0.6 
billion. The U.S. is Japan's number one trading partner while 
Japan is the U.S.'s number two partner. Japan is a major market 
for U.S. agricultural products, raw materials like wood, and U.S. 
aircraft. Japan is the major supplier of automobiles, consumer 
electronics, telecommunications equipment and computers to the 
U.S..26
In 1985, Japan became the world's largest creditor nation 
while the U.S. became the world's largest debtor. Japan is a 
major investor in the U.S., purchasing $136 billion worth of U.S. 
government securities to finance the U.S. budget deficit, $10.6 
billion worth of U.S. stock and directly investing up to $23.4 
billion in manufacturing, retailing and service industries.27 In
26 See Nikshe's, Japan-U.S. Relations in the 1990s.
27 Ibid.
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the early 1980s Japan decided to support the U.S. financially in 
order to create a market for its exports and because of high U.S. 
interest rates.28 However, as Gilpin points out, "...in the long 
run, political concerns and interests will determine the 
willingness of Japan to continue financial support of American 
hegemony and prosperity".29
Although these figures indicate a form of interdependence 
and cooperation, the main statistic, the U.S. $53.8 billion trade 
deficit with Japan, represents the source of the current U.S.- 
Japanese friction. The trade deficit has increased from $19.3 
billion in 1982 to $55.7 billion in 1988. This condition has 
spurred the U.S. Congress to pressure Japan to open its markets 
to foreign goods.
Arguments
a. U.S. Congress
Burden-sharing in terms of trade demands that the actors 
"play fair" by maintaining the free market system based on 
unimpeded competition. The U.S. accuses Japan of restricting 
foreign access to its markets, dumping, government intervention 
in the form of subsidies and export credits and structural
28 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 338.
29 Ibid.
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impediments such as its tax and distribution systems. Thus, 
Japan, they say, is not playing by the rules or according to a 
"level playing field".30 They are protecting their own industries 
from foreign competition and at the same time are benefiting from 
the free market system.31 These obstacles have prevented the 
U.S. from increasing its exports and, in turn, foreign exchange 
earnings. Without more foreign exchange, the U.S. has been 
unable to bridge the trade gap with Japan and its own budget 
deficit. Because of these changes, the U.S. is demanding that 
Japan operate according to the principle of "reciprocity".32
This U.S. demand has sparked a debate over whether to employ 
the "reciprocity" approach or a "national treatment" policy, 
"reciprocity" suggests that American companies in Japan should be 
treated in exactly the same way as Japanese companies are treated 
in the United States. Or, because the U.S. maintains free 
markets, so should Japan. "National treatment" implies that 
businesses operating in a foreign country will be subject to that 
states laws and rules, thus preserving the sovereignty of each 
state.
b. Japan
30 Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Cites Japan, India and Brazil 
as Unfair Traders," New York Times. (26 May 1989).
31 James Fallows, "Containing Japan," The Atlantic (May 
1989) : 44 .
32 See Keohane's "reciprocity and International Relations" 
for explanations of specific and diffuse reciprocity.
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Japan maintains that the U.S. cannot compete with them in 
terms of product quality, service and price. Further, the U.S., 
they say, is preoccupied with keeping its hegemonic position in 
the international system, not fair competition.33 The U.S. has 
imposed quotas and tariffs on Japanese products, so how can the 
government espouse free market principles? In addition, the U.S. 
has not seriously confronted the budget deficit problem. Instead 
of using Japanese success as a target for criticism, the U.S. 
should improve its own economy and competitiveness. Instead of 
focussing on short-term planning and profits, U.S. businessmen 
should plan according to long-term goals of creating a strong 
competitive base through improved productivity and technology.
U.S., Japanese Approaches to the Trade Disputes
Since the 1985 Plaza accord, when the G-7 agreed to 
stabilize foreign exchange rates, the U.S. has tried to reduce 
the trade deficit in two ways. First, its macroecnomic policy 
supported a low dollar and high yen in order to increase exports 
and force the Japanese economy to become more import-oriented. 
However, this policy has not achieved short-term success.
Although U.S. exports have risen, so have Japanese exports to the 
U.S., especially of capital goods. Second, U.S.'s microeconomic
33 Hobart Rowen, "The U.S. Should Accept the idea of sharing 
power with Japan," The Washington Post (23 October 1988).
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policy favored sector-by-sector negotiations with Japan in the 
semi-conductor, telecommunications and automobile parts 
industries in order to gain entry to Japan of products where the 
U.S. has a competitive edge. This approach has also failed to 
improve the U.S. trade imbalance.34
Because of the apparent failure of these approaches, 
President Bush outlined a new approach in June of 1989, known as 
the "structural impediments initiative" (SII). This new approach 
is designed to force Japan to eliminate invisible market barriers 
to trade and finance. These include: rotation of contracts among 
Japanese construction firms35, manufacturing companies' strong 
control over suggested retail prices, and differences in the 
price of manufactured goods in and outside the U.S.36 Structural 
adjustments in Japan include altering customary business 
practices such as the "Keiretsu", a system of interlocking 
shareholdings. In the U.S., adjustments include altering the 
social systems such as education and labor-management as a way to 
open markets and to promote international competitiveness.37 
However, the method of achieving these adjustments is still 
unclear.
34 Sumio Kido and Yuko Inoue, "U.S. trade focus blurs big 
picture," Japan Economic Journal 2 6 June 1989.
35 This system is known as "dango".
36 Sumio Kido and Yuko Inoue, "U.S. Trade Focus Blurs Big 
Picture."
37 Ibid.
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Another approach, this time initiated by Congress with 
much less support from the president, is characterized as 
"results oriented" where the U.S. is seeking more direct measures 
to improve the trade deficit. Passage of the Super 3 01 clause of 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 give Congress 
and the U.S. Trade Representative more direct influence in trade 
disputes. The clause transfers authority from the President to 
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to determine if a foreign 
trade practice meets section 301 criteria for action.38 It also 
transfers the authority to the USTR to determine what action, if 
any, to take and to implement the action.39
Thus, USTR Carla Hills labelled Japan an "unfair" trading 
partner through its inclusion as a priority country on the "super 
301" list. If Japan does not eliminate import barriers within 18 
months on supercomputer, communications satellites and forest 
products, the U.S. will be forced to take retaliatory, including 
sanctions up to 100% tariffs, measures against Japan. The 
transfer of power was partly the result of trade policy critics 
who complained that the President "had not used his section 301 
authority sufficiently and that our trade partners had been able 
to block U.S. exports with impunity".40 The transfer also allows
38 William H. Cooper et al. CRS Report for Congress: The 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 88-390E 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1 September
1988): 7.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 6.
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the USTR to act with less influence from non-trade Presidential 
advisors. There is a feeling in Congress, then, that the U.S. is 
finally "getting tough" with the Japanese by setting demands and 
time limits for settlement of disputes. Others criticize the
action claiming it could lead to further protectionist measures.
The Japanese reaction to the decision was extremely 
critical. Former Prime Minister Sosuke Uno stated the trade 
imbalance in Japan's favor is partly due to the huge U.S. budget
deficit. Based on these assumptions, he argues that;
...the implementation of the super 301 provision is an 
attempt to divert attention from the major cause of the 
trade imbalance and to eschew the responsibilities of the 
U.S. in macro economic policies.41
Uno1s Trade Minister, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, summed up Japan's view 
saying that the U.S.'s unilateral decision is "extremely 
regrettable" and could adversely affect multilateral talks in the 
Uruguay round of GATT.42 He continued;
...Japan will voluntarily rectify its trade system if 
necessary as a nation who benefited most from the 
multilateral free trade system in the world...If we 
recognize the need to discuss particular trade issues, we 
will be ready to talk at the GATT but not in the pretext of 
unilateral trade sanctions of the U.S. based on that 
country's law...my understanding is that the U.S. is only 
trying to put its trade law into practice.43
41 FBIS, EAS-89-101, 26 May 1989 Kvodo, 26 May 1989, 1.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 2.
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In addition, businessmen in the computer, satellite and lumber 
industries stated that they do not unfairly protect their 
industries. They cited import growth in these areas as evidence 
of increasing trade liberalization.44 Although some U.S. 
Congressmen admit that Japan has been cooperating by honoring 
trade agreements, they complain that Japan is not complying fast 
enough. Thus, one motivation for citing Japan as an "unfair" 
trading partner was to force Japan to quicken its pace toward 
liberalization.
Possibilities of and Limits to Cooperation
Currently, Japan refuses to conduct bilateral negotiations 
under the threat of retaliation and says that the U.S. action 
could hurt multilateral talks concerning free-trade.45 In the 
short term, then Congress' approach may limit mutual adjustment. 
The Japanese preferred the previous bilateral sectoral approach 
to negotiations. The U.S., however, is trying to gain leverage 
by linking "as many complex disputes as possible at the same 
time".46 This tactical approach is likely to succeed only if
44 Ibid., 4.
45 Stuart Auerbach, "Japan Cited by Bush as Unfair Trader," 
The Washington Post 26 May 1989, A14.
46 Richard A. Gephart, "Great Necessities Call Out Great 
Virtues," Vital Speeches of The Day vol. IV, no. 15 (15 May
1989): 450.
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Japan perceives greater benefits by complying and greater costs, 
that is less market access, by not agreeing to this approach.
Statistics show that the trade surplus is worsening rather 
than improving.47 Although Japan and the U.S. have made progress 
in trade disputes concerning telecommunications and in 
agricultural products, the Congress and some businesses continue 
to criticize Japan's structural impediments in trade. Japan 
faults the U.S. for its current trade deficit, citing its 
unwillingness to improve the budget deficit. According to Larry 
Niksche's CRS report:
...Economic relations between the United States and Japan 
will continue to be a key challenge and probably the key 
challenge to the relationship in the 1990s. Present 
tensions over trade imbalances, market access, and 
investment flows are certain to persist. They undoubtedly 
will affect the political and security aspects of the 
relationship. The future of the relationship will depend 
on the ability of the U.S. and Japanese governments to 
contain economic frictions and, especially, to limit the 
"spillover" effects.4®
Most experts agree that Japanese economic power, based on new 
methods of production and advanced technology, will expand into 
the 21st century at a rate equal to or faster than that of the 
U.S.49
In addition to an increased trade deficit, trade disputes
47 See Direction of Trade Statistics for trends.
48 Larry Niksch, "Japan-U.S. relations in the 1990s," 4.
49 The Washington Times. 3 January 1989, 4.
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are likely to continue.50 By following the Structural 
Impediments Initiative and a tactical issue-linkage approach to 
negotiations, the U.S. will continue to conceive burden-sharing 
in terms of trade. That is, by negotiating a reduction of these 
barriers, the U.S. hopes to entice Japan to play according to the 
rules of a "level playing field" and help the trade imbalance by 
importing more U.S. goods. However, others argue that passage of 
the super 301 may promote protectionist trade practices and lead 
the international system away from liberalism.51
The trade dispute also has implications for the U.S. as a 
financial leader. According to Robert Gilpin, the current trade 
discord is a result of the Reagan Administration's defense 
buildup and fiscal policy.52 In order to finance the huge 
increase, the Federal Reserve increased interest rates attracting 
foreign, that is Japanese, purchasing of U.S. treasury bonds. 
Reagan's policy of low taxes coupled with a low U.S. savings rate 
placed the role of financing the U.S. military buildup on 
Japan.53
In the long-run, however, Japan's willingness to continue 
financial support of U.S. interests may decline, causing the 
economic power and influence of the U.S. to fall even more.
50 Ibid.
51 Auerbach, "Japan Cited by Bush as Unfair Trader," A14.
52 Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. 
330-332.
53 Ibid.
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Thus, the key measurements of power are shifting from military to 
trade and financial capabilities. The U.S. ability to act as a 
lender of last resort is in jeopardy. Whether or not Japan can 
assume responsibility is questionable. However, one area where 
Japan is creating a larger role for itself in terms of financial 
support is foreign aid.
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FOREIGN AID
Introduction
The majority of Japanese policy-makers believe "because we 
cannot dramatically increase our defense spending, we should use 
our aid policy as a diplomatic card to head off possible 
pressures from the Western allies".54 Japan is now the world's 
largest ODA donor, next to the U.S., dispersing up to $10 billion 
annually to less developed countries (LDCs). This fact has been 
overlooked by many because of criticism focused on trade and 
defense imbalances. In the past, foreign aid was one area where 
Japan and the U.S. have cooperated in "aid policy 
coordination".55 Thus, it provides an area where Japan can 
answer current burden-sharing demands. Because Japan is still 
dependent on LDCs for natural resources such as energy and food 
and also as a market for Japanese goods, it is vulnerably 
dependent upon these countries. In addition, its relationship 
with the West has forced Japan to be concerned with states of 
geopolitical importance.56
54 Opposition parties are against such a policy and would 
establish a new government agency and a law regulating ODA 
spending. See "LDP, Opposition Disagree on Use of Aid," The Japan 
Economic Journal, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
25 May 1989.
55 William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr., "Japan's 
Foreign Economic Assistance," Asian Survey, vol. XXV, no. 3, 
(March 1985): 322.
56 Ibid., 322.
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Definition: Official Development Assistance
Official development assistance is given both bilaterally 
through Japanese public and private institutions such as the 
Export-Import Bank of Japan, the Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund (OECF), and the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and multilaterally through the World Bank, International 
Development Agency and the Asian Development Bank. Each type 
contains grant and loan elements. Bilateral grant aids include 
economic development and other assistance, food aid and technical 
cooperation. Multilateral grants go to the UN, UN agencies and 
to international development agencies. Japan's loans are given 
through the OECF and Ex-Im Bank. Multilateral loans are given 
through the World Bank and the International Development Agency 
(IDA).
Background
Initially, Japan's foreign aid programs were commercially 
oriented, with no underlying philosophy or policy objectives.57 
From 1950 to 1965 Japan conducted reparations negotiations with 
Southeast Asian nations, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, 
which were occupied by Japan during WWII. Japan benefited 
commercially by tying aid to "procurement" from Japan which
57 Ibid., 323.
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established financial institutions and opened markets for 
Japanese goods in Southeast Asia. From the mid 1950s-1970s, aid 
was excessively tied and used to promote exports. After joining 
the exclusive OECD as the first non-Western state, Japan was 
increasingly subjected to pressures from other states within the 
organization and from the Third World to untie its aid.58
In 1972 it began to untie its multilateral aid and in 1975, 
focused on untying bilateral aid. In the 1970s, mainly because 
of the Arab oil embargo, Japan conducted "resource diplomacy", 
directing its aid to resource-rich countries for large-scale 
resource development or industrial projects. Also, because of 
the Iranian Revolution, the invasion of Afghanistan and 
Kampuchea, and the slowing down of the world economy, Japan 
started linking its aid to security interests.59 Thus, under the 
concept of "comprehensive security", Japan sought to integrate 
diplomatic, aid and defense efforts into a foreign policy frame­
work designed to meet its own as well as Western security 
interests.60 Because of military limitations, policy-makers 
decided to use economic assistance as a major foreign policy 
tool. They thought that providing enough foreign aid to 
countries of strategic, geopolitical interest would promote 
stability and prevent external intervention.61
58 Ibid., 325.
59 Ibid., 326.
60 Ibid., 327.
61 Ibid., 326.
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By 1980, Japan was providing $3 billion annually in ODA, 
double that of 1978, and was planning another doubling of ODA. 
Although Japan gives most of its ODA to the ASEAN states under 
the concept of comprehensive security, its program increasingly 
includes assistance tied less excessively to large-scale, 
capital-intensive projects and more to the economic development 
of LDCs in Latin America and Subsahara Africa. The main portion 
of its aid has been and will continue to be disbursed throughout 
Asia.62
Japan's ODA Statistics
Japan gives economic assistance to 13 4 developing countries. 
Currently it is the second largest donor among Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development members after the U.S. From 
1965 to 1988, Japan's ODA increased from about $244 million to 
$10 billion. From 1982 to 1987, 1988 Japanese ODA increased from 
$3,023 billion to $8.8 and $10 billion respectively.63
Although guantitative increases in ODA show a trend toward 
Japan assuming a leadership role in the foreign aid area, other 
indicators remain below the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) average. Japan's ODA/GNP ratio was .29% in 1987 which was
62 See Japan's Economic Planning Agency's 1988-92 Five Year 
Economic Plan.
63 Much of this increase is due to the rise in value of the
yen.
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below the DAC average of .3 6%.64 Finally, the DAC average is 
well below the United Nations-recommended level of .7%.65
Arguments
a. Aid Philosophy
An argument between the U.S. and Japan relating to ODA 
concerns Japan's aid philosophy. The U.S. says that it does not 
have a real philosophy except to promote exports. Japan, 
however, explains it does have an overall approach which includes 
three main principles: self-reliance among recipient countries 
("request only"), an apolitical stance on the part of the donor, 
and combining of public and private efforts to promote 
development.66 According to Barbara Stallings, "these factors 
lead to a reluctance to impose bilateral conditionality on loans 
and to a lack of enthusiasm for economic lending on strategic 
grounds, both of which have been criticized by the U.S. 
government".67
64 Japan's ODA/GNP ratios from 1982 to 1986 were .28%, .33%, 
.35%, .29% and .29% respectively.
65 Eilleen M. Doherty, "Japan's foreign aid policy: 1987 
Update," Japan Economic Institute 41A, 3 0 October 1987.
66 Barbara Stallings, "An Increased Japanese Role in Third 
World Development," Policy Focus, no. 6, (1988): 5.
67 Ibid.
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Japan's "request only" policy appears to show non­
interference in the domestic policies of other states. However, 
it is also used as a selective instrument which promotes Japanese 
technical assistance and trade. Under this policy the four 
ministries which guide Japanese ODA policy, The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), The Ministry of International Trade and 
Investment (MITI), The Economic Planning Agency (EPA), and The 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) set annual aid targets to LDCs and 
handle recipient project requests, developed with the Japanese 
private sector. Each request is handled on a case-by-case basis 
under the Yon Shocho system.68 The new five-year economic plan 
states that Japan is moving away from "request-only" to a more 
aggressive approach.69
Recent events show that Japan is reconsidering its past 
apolitical stance by withholding its 97 billion yen loan to China 
in light of the current political unrest.70 In addition, Japan's 
major participation in the Multilateral Assistance Initiative for 
the Philippines, which includes $6-10 billion to be disbursed 
over a five-year period beginning in 1990, indicates that 
strategic interests with the West are involved.71 Japan's aid
68 David Arase, paper presented at the annual International 
Studies Association conference, 1989 London.
69 See Five-year Economic Plan.
70 See Foreign Broadcast Information Service daily report, 
the first time Japan has severely criticized China for its actions.
71 "Donors hope aid will stabilize Philippines," The Japan 
Economic Journal. 10 June 1989.
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philosophy is changing to meet its own interests, including 
increased trade opportunities, and its security interests with 
the West.
b. Allocation
The U.S. and the international lending organizations 
criticize Japan's uneven disbursements of ODA. Japan allocates 
most of its ODA to Asian countries for historical, geographic, 
economic and political reasons.72 By the end of the 1970s, 
Japan's 7-1-1-1 formula for aid allocation was
institutionalized.73 This meant that 70% of its ODA went to Asia 
while 10% each went to Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
Recent actions, however, indicate that Japan is concerned 
with non-Asian areas. In 1988 It set up a "special fund" of $2 
billion within the World Bank for improved development of 
Subsahara Africa. It also increased its ODA to strategic 
countries like Oman, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey and technical 
assistance to the Middle East to help facilitate the passage of 
ships in the Persian Gulf. Thus, Japan uses ODA to maintain 
security in non-Asian as well as Asian areas. Finally, Japan's 
involvement in Latin America is not rapidly expanding in terms of 
ODA disbursement, yet the debt problem spurred its trade surplus 
recycling initiative. This initiative, announced in 1987, is
72 Orr, 328.
73 Dougherty, "Japan's foreign aid policy: 1987 Update," 7.
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intended to divert $20 billion to debtor nations with $4 billion 
targeted to Latin America.74 Despite these increases, the U.S. 
says that it is still not enough.
Proposals by Japanese suggest that rather than Japan trying 
to eliminate its trade surplus, it should send more excess funds 
to developing countries. Specifically, it should recycle $25 
billion annually to the LDCs over a five-year period and should 
triple the 1985 ODA figure by 1990. A proposal by the U.S.
Senate included an amendment to the Defense Department 
authorization bill calling on Japan to increase its ODA/GNP ratio 
to 3% by 1992.75 The current percentage is .29, making this 
request highly unfeasible considering the amount of ODA Japan has 
already pledged. Despite increased ODA to non-Asian areas, Japan 
will most likely continue to focus its aid on Asia because of 
trade opportunities, cultural ties and a greater knowledge of the 
area.
c. Aid Quality
Another source of tension between the U.S. and Japan is the 
amount of grants and loans contained in Japan's ODA. Ideally,
ODA should be "untied" to the purchase of goods and in the form 
of grants with a greater emphasis on social infrastructure. In
74 Michelle Rockier, "Japan Funneling $30 billion to Third 
World," Times of the Americas 21 September 1988, 13.
75 Dougherty, 7.
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the past, Japan has focused on tying its ODA loans to the 
purchase of expensive equipment for capital-intensive projects, 
actions which contradict DAC requirements.76 Although Japan has 
directly untied its ODA, many argue that it remains indirectly 
tied to the engineering portion of aid. That is, because Japan 
requires feasibility studies from the recipient before a project 
is accepted, this requirement forces the recipient to rely on 
Japanese consultants.77 These consultants can then influence the 
project to be developed and the type of equipment to be used, 
usually Japanese.
On the surface, the past few years, however, show a trend 
that Japan is increasing its role in Third World development 
according to the principles of international development 
institutions. Japan's grant share of ODA has increased, terms of 
loans have been softened, less money has gone to large-scale 
projects, tying has declined well below the DAC average, and more 
funds have been targeted for the least developed countries.78
On the other hand, a closer look indicates that Japan 
intends to continue to focus its ODA in Asia, encouraging more 
imports, foreign direct investment and ODA. Japan's 1988 five 
year economic plan links ODA, investment and trade under the
76 Stallings, 5. DAC refers to the Development Assistance 
Committee.
77 Usually, LDCs in Asia do not have the expertise that 
Japan does, but in other areas of the world this is not true.e.g. 
in Subsaraha Africa and Latin America.
78 Trends can be found by analyzing Development Cooperation 
annual reports.
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concept of "comprehensive economic cooperation".79 Instead of 
following the "request-only" policy, the plan indicates that 
Japan will take a greater initiative by making country-by-country 
aid plans, helping LDCs draw up their own development plans and 
will invite Korea and Taiwan to implement aid programs.80
d. Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid
In its bilateral relationship with Japan, the U.S. has urged 
Japan to give more ODA for strategic reasons. On the other hand, 
the U.S. has asked Japan to contribute more to the World Bank and 
IMF according to their principles. Thus, Japan is being 
pressured to fulfill two roles, that of an "ally" to the West and 
as a world leader promoting development and stability.
In both instances, as stated in chapter two, Japan is 
concerned with its reputation and credibility within the 
international system. Japan has given more for strategic reasons 
in order to maintain a credible partnership with the West. In 
addition, it has increased its multilateral ODA to promote the 
image of a "Japan which contributes to the world" through 
peaceful means compared to its past militaristic reputation.
In theory, strategic considerations should not be a factor 
in multilateral ODA allocations. In practice, however, two 
factors serve to conceal this distinction. First, countries
79 Takeshita, 3.
80 Arase, 11.
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labelled both as LDCs and which are strategically important to 
U.S.-Japanese security interests can receive multilateral ODA 
under the guise of "development". Second, the U.S.-Japanese 
bilateral relationship is also reflected in multilateral 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Although these 
institutions are supposed to be apolitical, it is almost 
impossible to ignore the self-interests of the actors who 
influence policy.
A central argument concerning bilateral versus multilateral 
aid maintains that, according to the U.S., Japanese bilateral ODA 
should have a balanced combination of both private and 
governmental contributions. If the governmental agencies give 
more ODA, it less likely to be tied to commercial interests 
compared to grants and loans given by the private sector. 
Currently, however, most of Japan's ODA is given by the private 
sector because that is where the surplus is generated. The 
government budget is actually running a deficit. Despite this 
predicament, Japan is continuing to search for cooperation on 
debt and development between the government and private sector.81
In line with this argument, the U.S. continues to demand 
that Japan give more to multilateral development institutions. 
Despite the fact that Japan is now the number one donor, 
quantitatively, of ODA compared to DAC members the U.S. cites
81 Saburo Okita, "Japanese Aid Policy and The Recycling of 
the Surplus for Development," Draft (March 1988): 13.
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the fact that Japan spends only .29% of its GNP on ODA compared 
to the DAC average of .3 6%.82
Another issue involves increased quotas from Japan to the 
World Bank. Specifically, Japan has increased its quota from 
17,539 shares in 1980 to 52,626 in 1988. At the same time, its 
voting power, a reflection of its quota in the Bank, has 
increased from 5.30% in 1980 to 6.65% in 1988.83 The voting 
power of the U.S., on the other hand, has declined from 21.11% in 
1980 to 18.72% in 1988. Because of its trade and budget 
deficits, the U.S. is contributing less and less.
Despite this trend, the U.S. does not want to lose its 
hegemonic position in the World Bank. Thus, in December of 1986, 
the U.S. negotiated an agreement with Japan which would allow the 
U.S. to retain veto power over major policy changes, a privilege 
it has enjoyed since the founding of the organization.84 In 
return, Japan could increase its voting power.85 The agreement
allowed the veto threshold to be lowered from 2 0% to 15% where a
country with over a 15% voting power, that is the U.S., may
82 List DAC members
83 Japan is now ahead of France (4.93%), Germany (5.14%) and
the U.K. (4.93%) in terms of voting power.
84 Creating "special funds" like Japan's contributions to 
Subsahara Africa through the World Bank will likely continue. 
Since Japan is apprehensive about taking responsibility within 
the WB, it can still answer demands that it contribute more 
without dramatically increasing its voting power by using such 
instruments as "special funds" which do not affect voting power.
85 "U.S. to reduce voting power in World Bank" Wall Street 
Journal. (16 December 1986).
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exercise the veto. Despite this agreement, Japan argues that its 
voting power within both the World Bank and the IMF is not an 
accurate reflection of the amount of money it contributes to 
these organizations.
The U.S. cites Japanese inexperience in decision-making and 
lack of technical knowledge as reasons why Japanese influence 
should remain low. However, Japan's willingness to act as the 
world's largest creditor within international organizations 
without commensurate political influence will not last 
indefinitely. These shifting power relations within the World 
Bank and IMF are a reflection of wider shifting capabilities 
within the international system.86 For the time being, however, 
the U.S. is still able to significantly influence agreements 
within the World Bank and IMF.
Summary
Four trends in aid philosophy, allocation, quality and 
bilateral versus multilateral aid can be drawn from the previous 
analysis. First, most believe that Japan's aid philosophy is 
leading away from the "request only" approach to one which 
requires initiative and more government-private sector 
cooperation by Japan. The U.S. wants Japan to increase its ODA 
through government funds because it is less likely to be tied to
86 See Krasner's International Regimes. 15 for explanation 
of power as a variable which causes regimes to change.
80
trade and finance. However, since the trade surplus is generated 
within the private sector, it is inevitable that this money will 
be used for increased ODA. Second, on the whole, Japan's aid 
will continue to focus on Asia and to those of strategic 
importance while Japan continues to give aid to the World Bank to 
improve its reputation and credibility. While the U.S. supports 
Japanese ODA to the WB and IDA, it does not want to cede the 
accompanying "power-sharing" privileges to Japan. In addition, 
the U.S. fears that Japanese concentration of ODA in Asia will 
create a powerful Asian co-prosperity bloc in terms of trade and 
finance. Third, Japan's aid, although directly untied, is 
indirectly tied. LDCs , especially in Asia, are dependent on 
Japan for technical assistance to produce the required 
feasibility study. Therefore, along with allocating Japanese ODA 
more evenly, the U.S. supports both directly and indirectly 
untied aid in order to prevent this bloc in which Japan would be 
the major trading and financial power.
Fourth, Regarding the bilateral versus multilateral aid 
choice, Japan will likely give more through both channels because 
it has the money. However, it will continue to give more 
bilateral than multilateral because of business opportunities 
which will benefit trade.
Based on mutual interests, Japan, as a response to U.S. 
burden-sharing demands, has answered requests to increase its 
strategic aid. Using strategic aid as a means of fulfilling 
military contributions to burdensharing provides an example where
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issue linkage is used to achieve cooperation. However, the issue 
of power-sharing, especially in international organizations, is 
emerging as another concern which the U.S. must inevitably 
confront.
CONCLUSION
The previous analysis of military, trade and finance, and 
foreign aid attempts to outline the dilemmas and approaches to 
their resolution produced by the changing U.S.-Japanese 
interdependent relationship. Variables such as power, interests 
and culture are transforming the arrangements created after WWII. 
Although in the past these arrangements have guided state 
behavior, maintaining a cooperative relationship, one could argue 
that the current discord is the result of uncertainty produced by 
a relatively declining hegemon, the U.S., and a slowly emerging 
power, Japan, which has yet to assume economic leadership.
CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS FOR U .S.-JAPANESE COOPERATION:
JAPAN'S FUTURE ROLE RECONSIDERED
After introducing the concepts of interdependence and 
cooperation, the previous analysis focused on the changing U.S.- 
Japanese relationship. Chapter two answered questions concerning 
Japan's future world role in relation to its past and to other 
states. It shows the constraining effects of uncertainty, 
misperceptions and ill-defined interests on forming world roles. 
Chapter three examined the concept of burden-sharing developed by 
the U.S. as a policy to deal with its inability to maintain 
overseas commitments. Development of policy on both sides to 
address the effects of shifting capabilities and to define future 
roles are often misguided because of problems of uncertainty, 
perceptions and misperceptions.
Chapter four examined in detail the U.S.-Japanese 
interdependent relationship in areas of military, trade and 
finance, and foreign aid. These areas are interlinked, sometimes 
forming channels for cooperation, or mutual adjustment, and other 
times conflict. For instance, in burden-sharing, linking demands 
for increased Japanese military spending to the trade dispute has 
created more discord than cooperation. On the other hand, linking 
Japan's wealth to demands that it increase its foreign aid 
contributions as a form of burden-sharing has been more 
successful in terms of cooperation.
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UNCERTAINTY AND COOPERATION?
From the present U.S.-Japan interdependent relationship, it 
is apparent that uncertainty promotes conflict while leaving open 
the possibilities for cooperation. However, the U.S.'s past 
relationship with Japan was much more predictable, enabling 
policies to adjust to mutual expectations. Under what 
circumstances, then, does uncertainty promote cooperation? Some 
argue that because the U.S., as the dominant world power, was 
able to influence Japan, a powerless state, into accepting formal 
treaties, this guaranteed certain state behavior in line with 
U.S. interests. Thus, the uncertainty created after WWII was 
modified by the hegemonic leadership of the U.S.. This leadership 
promoted a form of cooperation, not based on equality, but on the 
distribution of power.
Although the U.S. was the dominant military and economic 
power, both sides benefited from the relationship. The U.S. 
benefited from the security of Japan as a political and 
ideological ally. Japan profited from the U.S. security system 
and U.S. leadership in foreign policy which enabled them to 
concentrate on economic development.
Now, due to shifting capabilities, this order seems to be 
threatened. As Japan's wealth increases and U.S. influence 
waivers, perceived interests are changing. Many Japanese claim 
that the U.S. is only concerned with maintaining its hegemonic 
role in the world. Others believe that Japanese rhetoric, which
attempts to portray it as a nation pursuing peace through 
economic diplomacy, only masks their true intentions of becoming 
the world's dominant economic power.
The current uncertainty about interests and intentions and 
the resulting instability can only be rectified, according to 
some, through continued support of the U.S. as the world leader 
in trade, finance and defense.1 Japan is constrained because of 
its diplomatic inexperience and little knowledge of other 
cultures. In addition, Japan does not have the ability to act as 
a lender of last resort, to maintain open markets and to make and 
enforce the rules of the international economic system as the 
U.S. did.
On the other hand, stability of the international system may 
not depend on the leadership of the U.S. or Japan as a hegemon. 
Although the leadership of a single state, based on the 
distribution of power, is important in maintaining stability, 
cooperation can occur by adhering, rationally, to international 
regimes.2 Today the burden of assuming hegemonic leadership at 
the previous U.S. level is too great for any one state raising 
the importance of international regimes in facilitating mutual 
adjustments.
FACTORS INFLUENCING JAPAN'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE
1 Samuel P. Huntington has expressed this view repeatedly. 
See his article "The U.S.-Decline or Renewal?," Foreign Affairs 
(1989) .
2 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy. 63-64.
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The U.S.-Japanese relationship directly relates to the 
stability of the world system because of the enormous economic 
and military power of the two combined. Therefore, although the 
previous chapters emphasized their bilateral relationship, I will 
here draw some conclusions concerning Japan's future world role. 
To restate, the four future scenarios developed by contemporary 
theorists are; Pax Americana II, Joint Hegemony, Pax Consortium 
and Pax Nipponica.
In military, economic and foreign aid terms both external 
and internal factors will shape Japan's future world role. 
Externally, perceptions of Japan's dramatic increase in wealth, 
the trend towards regionalism and perceptions of military threats 
will inevitably shape its future character. Internally, 
governmental instability, changing domestic views of its future 
role, and cultural values will affect domestic and foreign policy 
designed to achieve a new role.
External Influences
As stated earlier, a state's own perceptions and those of 
others are important in defining interests and policies.
Regional and global perceptions of Japan's growing economic power 
constrains its ability to become the "balancer among the 
continental powers". Past fears among Korea, China and other 
Asian states of Japan's attempt to create a Greater Co-prosperity
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Sphere in Asia still prevail. In addition, the U.S. still views 
Japan's rise in power with caution. The possibility of its 
economic power translating into military power could conceivably 
allow Japan to replace the U.S. as the world's hegemon. The 
U.S., therefore, is demanding that Japan, as its traditional 
ally, share the burden of its overseas commitments. This policy 
is designed to maintain the U.S. as world leader both 
economically and military while at the same time limiting Japan's 
threat to U.S. economic security. The trend towards
regionalism has also raised concerns about the effects on the 
world trading system. Will the economic integration of the EEC 
in 1992 and the development of the U.S.-Canada free-trade pact 
lead the international system away from liberalism towards 
protectionism? Because Japan is uncertain as to whether or not 
these trading blocs will erect tariffs and quotas on outside 
imports, it is seeking to protect its own economic security by 
increasing trade and financial flows within the Asia Pacific 
region.
Another reason why it is turning to its own region as a 
source of economic security includes the consequences of U.S. 
attempts to balance its own budget. According to the Japanese, 
these measures will decrease U.S. ability to import goods, which 
would negatively affect Japan since it is the U.S.'s number two 
trading partner next to Canada. In addition, because Japanese 
influence depends solely on its economic power, fear of this 
influence decreasing has forced Japan to focus its ODA on Asia.
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Allocating more loans and grants denominated in Yen to Asian 
states will force them to purchase goods in Yen, further 
integrating this currency and trade within the region. As Japan 
shifts production offshore to cut rising production costs this 
also integrates trade and financial relations.
However, the perception factor also plays a role in limiting 
Japan's economic dominance in the Asian region. The "Four 
Dragons", Hongkong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, and the 
"new NICs", Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, do 
not support a "Yen bloc".3 They want increased trade with Japan 
to complement the U.S. market.4 Based on historical fears, this 
approach, in their view, would limit the possibility of Japan 
forcefully dominating the region through its economic and 
potential military power. The Japanese are aware of these 
sentiments and have no desire to portray themselves as an 
aggressive nation. They are trying to balance their own economic 
interests with interests of other states. They have slowly 
answered U.S. demands that Japan liberalize trade barriers, while 
at the same time covering its bases by increasing trade ties in 
its own region.
Continued perceptions of a Soviet military threat are also 
shaping Japan's future world role. They have forced Japan to 
answer U.S. demands to take a greater responsibility for its own
3 "The Yen Block: A New Balance in Asia?," The Economist (15 
July 1989): 6.
4 Ibid.
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defense as the U.S. can no longer shoulder the burden alone.
With modest increases in the defense budget, Japan is appeasing 
U.S. demands. At the same time, however, it must be careful not 
to arouse fears among its Asian neighbors of a resurgent 
militaristic Japan. Thus, Japan is balancing foreign interests 
based on perceptions of Japanese intentions with its own economic 
interests.
Internal influences
Factors such as domestic instability, changing views of its 
future role and cultural values influence policy-making.
Within the last year, Japan has elected four different 
governments because of scandal. From Nakasone, Takeshita, Uno 
and now to Kaifu, the government has undergone upheaval which 
raises questions concerning resolution of disputes with the U.S..
As the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) cedes power to the 
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) after a thirty four year reign, the 
central question is how this leadership change will affect 
current defense, trade and foreign aid policies. As the JSP 
currently has the majority in the upper house of the Japanese 
parliament, it has tremendous power to block legislation formed 
in the lower house where the LDP holds the majority. The JSP has 
stated that it will try to prevent the strategic allocation of 
ODA in addition to limiting a military buildup. It maintains 
that Japan should be more independent from the U.S. in the
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formulation of its foreign policy. However, the ability of the 
JSP to drastically change the current military, economic and 
foreign aid policies is limited. Businesses play a great role in 
promoting governmental policy especially in trade. As economic 
and military plans, linked to commercial interests, have already 
been developed and approved, they would be difficult to suspend 
through legislation. Thus, in the near future, a continuation of 
past policies is likely.
In addition to domestic instability, domestic opinion will 
help shape Japan's future character. As stated in chapter 2, the 
ordinary Japanese citizen does not want Japan to become a 
military power. They want to contribute to the world through 
diplomacy and foreign aid. The extent to which governmental 
policy accommodates these sentiments varies. As shown earlier, 
Japan's military budget has increased to meet its perceived needs 
and, to a certain extent, those of the U.S.. The Japanese people 
support this increase because it is moderate. They would not 
support a rapid increase in military expenditure and neither 
would most foreign states. Again, domestic perceptions of Japan 
being led by a militaristic and expansionist government is 
another factor preventing it from becoming a major military 
power.
CONCLUSIONS
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The above external factors of foreign perceptions, growing 
regionalism and military threats together with these internal 
factors of domestic instability, domestic opinion and cultural 
values are forging Japan's future world role. Both Pax Nipponica 
and Pax Consortium seem less likely because of their extremism. 
Pax Nipponica, portraying Japan as the world hegemon based on its 
economic strength and leaving open the possibility of Japan 
achieving military power, is less likely. Other states may 
prevent this by forming alliances against Japan. In addition, 
Japan would continue to depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The 
likelihood of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons is limited by 
domestic and foreign opinion. The ability of Japan to act as a 
lender of last resort and to maintain open markets especially to 
less developed countries is limited because of structural 
impediments. Finally, the potential economic power generated 
within EEC integration in 1992 and U.S.-Canada free-trade area 
would limit dependence of these states on Japan for trade and 
finance. Japan's dominance as world economic power would thus be 
constrained.
Pax Consortium, which portrays the world without a hegemon 
and where international regimes facilitate the settlement of 
disputes, is also unlikely because it tends to downplay the 
importance of state power on individual decision-making. The 
trend towards regionalism is raising fears concerning the 
effectiveness of the GATT free trade regime. As U.S. influence 
declines relative to other states, will members of GATT continue
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to follow the principles and norms of that institution without 
the leadership of its founder?
Concerning security regimes, it is true that majors powers 
such as the U.S. and the Soviet Union are conducting more arms 
negotiations as they find they can no longer maintain current 
levels of defense spending. Also, in economic security, 
coordination of monetary and financial policies among the Group 
of Seven (G-7) represents a form of "consortium" as they are 
becoming increasingly sensitive to others' choices. Despite this 
cooperation, the main feature of Pax Consortium, that is the 
settlement of disputes by non-military means, is not likely to 
occur in the future as long as the threat of nuclear weapons 
remains.5
This leaves Joint Hegemony and Pax Americana as the two most 
likely future scenarios. Joint Hegemony seems less likely in the 
near future. This partnership portrays Japan as the world and 
regional economic power. Although trends show that Japan may 
inevitably become the economic power in Asia, replacing the U.S.; 
as stated above, regional sentiments against this shift will slow 
its development. In the short term, both domestic and foreign 
opinion will prevent Japan from translating its economic power 
into military power. The U.S. also does not want to reduce its 
economic influence in the area to the point where Japan controls 
all trade and financial flows.
5 Inoguchi, 26.
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Militarily, recent collaboration between the U.S. and Japan 
on development of high-technology, especially for defense, may 
push the two powers into joint hegemony. On the other hand, the 
current trade friction between the two countries may not enable 
their economies to fully integrate, forcing them to seek 
alternative markets. Whether or not current perceptions of Japan 
based on historical fears change, this will influence the 
possibility of joint hegemony with the U.S..
Finally, Pax Americana II seems most likely in the short 
term. Japan states that it wants to remain number two to the 
U.S. while it continues to play its primary economic role. As it 
seeks to fulfill its role, Japan is diversifying its markets by 
shifting offshore into the U.S. and other Asian and European 
countries where the local economies can also benefit. Although 
they are eager to trade with Japan, Asian nations want the U.S. 
to remain as the region's economic leader to counterbalance 
Japan.
In addition, by answering U.S. burden-sharing demands that 
it spend more on defense and give more ODA, this takes some 
pressure off the U.S., enabling it to maintain its hegemonic role 
at a lower level. Although Japan is spending more on defense, 
this increase is not enough to liberate it from the U.S. security 
system in Asia.
These four scenarios all represent a form of cooperation and 
type of interdependence between the U.S. and Japan. They are not 
based on equality, rather, they involve various types of
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asymmetric relationships. Whether or not the two countries can 
manage the current trade frictions and its spill-over effects 
into the defense burden-sharing dispute is uncertain. Over time, 
Japan and the U.S. may learn from past mistakes and adjust 
policies to mutual expectations. The main problem, however, is 
identifying what these expectations include. With shifting 
capabilities, interests are changing making it difficult to 
clearly articulate goals.
In the long run, certain questions will arise concerning the 
U.S.'s relationship with Japan. On a broader level, will 
stability of the international system require hegemonic 
leadership or will international regimes play an increasingly 
important role? Relating this question to the U.S.-Japanese 
case, what roles will each country assume in order to promote 
stability? Domestic politics plus the transformation of the 
international system will significantly affect definitions of 
interests and formulation of policy. As trade seems to becoming 
the main tool of foreign policy, and as the U.S. Congress gains 
more control over decision-making in trade and foreign aid, what 
effect will this transformation have on the effectiveness of U.S. 
foreign policy? Will the problems of bureaucratic politics 
become more apparent within the U.S. and Japan, challenging 
realist assumptions that the state is a unitary actor? How will 
this change affect the U .S .-Japanese relationship?
Similarly, the disruptive domestic political scene in Japan 
raises questions concerning that country's future world role.
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Specifically, as the JSP gains the majority in the Upper House of 
the Japanese parliament, how will this shift in power affect 
foreign policy-making in Japan? Will the JSP be able to 
effectively block defense, trade and foreign aid legislation 
submitted by the LDP which is more sympathetic to U.S. demands? 
How will these changes affect the possibilities for Pax Americana 
II and Joint Hegemony? These are questions which will 
undoubtedly arise as the relationship evolves. In the mean time, 
the basic structure of the relationship will remain the same 
while certain modifications will forge Japan's new role under Pax 
Americana II.
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